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PREFACE 
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tive of this study is to illustrate the role that political events in 
Rome during the Jugurthine War played in transforming the Republic into 
the Principate. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The election of Caius Marius as consul for the year 107 B.Ce 
illuminates the slow transition of Rome from a rep~blic to a monarchy.l 
The deterioration of the Republic was not eliminated when the oli-
garchs destroyed the Gracchi, for although the oiigarchs retained con-
trol of the government, the economic and military crises of the 
Republic continued. No solutions to these crises were attempted by 
the restoration government of the oligarchs; instead factional politics 
dominated their interest. The first serious challenge to this gov-
ernment resulted from the Jugurthine War. The bungling diplomatic 
maneuvers of the oligarchs during this war of succession in Numidia 
involved Rome in a prolonged struggle. Dissatisfaction with the 
progress of the war culminated in a serious political conflict be-
tween factions in Rome; it was this controversy which provided Marius 
with an opportunity to be elected consul. Marius was a politician-
general who was to become a model for other politician-generals such 
as Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar, whose careers were the funeral service 
for the dead Republic. 
The Jugurthine War occurred during a transitional period of the 
Republic 1 s life; it produced politica 1 and military conditions which 
rushed Rome into the Principate. This conflict witnessed the resur-
gence of dissatisfaction among the plebs and equites, the election of 
a politician-general, and the institution of a professional army. 
1 
These factors drastically influenced the development of the Roman 
Republic from the Gracchi to the military dictatorships of the late 
Republic. 
Primary source material for politics during the Jugurthine War 
is extremely limited. The only comprehensive primary source is 
Sallust's Bellum Iugurthinum. Sallust, however,. is not the ideal 
historian--he was a politician and projected political bias into his 
2 
monograph. Other primary sources have but scant references to politi-
cal events during the Numidian conflict; as a result, this era of 
Roman politics is especially open to historians' interpretations. 
Gaius Sallustius Crispus wrote the only comprehensive history 
covering 111-105, the period of the Jugurthine War. Sallust was born 
in Amiternum, a town north-east of Rome; unfortunately no knowledge 
exists of his early life. His political career began in 55 when he 
became a quaestor. In 52 he advanced to tribune of the plebs. 2 Sal-
lust was a novus homo to Roman politics; that term designated poli-
ticians whose family had no consular members. A member of the Senate 
since he was elected quaestor, Sallust became embroiled in factional 
politics. Accordingly he was expelled from the Senate in 50 by the 
censor Appius Claudius Pulcher. Rumors of lude behavior purportedly 
were responsible for his ouster but political manipulation was the 
actual reason. Roman politicians often employed rumors, whether 
imagined or factual, to discredit rivals. The ouster of Sallust does 
show that he was becoming a powerful politician, so influential, in 
fact, that his political demise was plotted by rivals. 3 
After this political defeat Sallust was identified as a partisan 
of Caesar. He may have been a follower of Caesar previously or per-
3 
·. haps made the sagacious decision to join Caesar as civil war with 
Pompey approached. 4 In 49 Caesar appointed him to another quaestor-
ship; iri command of Caesarian forces, Sallust suffered two major 
defeats--one in Illyricum in 48, and another in Campania in 47. As 
praetor in 46, Sallust redeemed his military honor and Caesar's con-
fidence by capturing Pompeian supplies on Circina. This victory won 
him an appointment as the proconsular governor of Africa. Upon his 
return to Rome from his governorship, Sallust was tried for extorting 
money in the province. Although formally acquitted, he was now 
innnensely wealthy, as his ownership of the horti Sallustiani, later the 
property of Roman emperors, testified. 5 
With Caesar's death Sallust's political career ended; retired, 
he now began to write Roman history. 6 In this new career Sallust 
proclaimed that he was still serving the Roman state, for in his view, 
writing the history of the Republic continued to fulfill the duty which 
every Roman had of serving the state. 7 .Sallust's first monograph con-
cerned the conspiracy of Cataline, his second the war with Jugurtha. 
He also write the Historia, a history which covered the years 78-67; 
unfortunat~ly very little of the Historia has survived. 8 In his his-
tories, S~llust chided Roman nobles who spent their leisure in hunting 
and farming. His monographs were admonitions to the Roman people to 
abandon the luxurious and frivolous for the virtues of the past. In-
stead of wasting his time, Sallust struggled to attain virtus, or out-
9 
standing state service, by writing history. 
Sallust's interest in the Jugurthine War stemmed from his service 
as governor of Africa. Other ancient historians--Livy, Plutcarch 
Appian, and Dio--superficially discuss the African conflict, but only 
4 
Sallust gives a comprehensive view. 10 Sallust grasps the significance 
of the war, and tells the reader his motivation for writing this his~ 
tory in the following passage: 
I propose to write of the war which the people of 
Rome waged with Jugurtha, king of the Numidians: first, 
because it was long, sanguinary and of varying fortune; 
and secondly, because then for the first time resistance 
was offered to.the insolence of the nobles--the beginning 
of a struggle which threw everything, human and divine, 
into confusion, and rose to such a pitch of frenzy that 11 
civil discord ended in war and the devastation of Italy. 
The significance of the Jugurthine War was not what happened to 
Numidia or Jugurtha; it was instead the effect factional politics in 
12 Rome had upon the Republic. Sallust wrote the Bellum Iugurthinum to 
prove how devastating the incompetence of the nollility was to the Re-
public. 
As a novus homo Sallust believed the nobility had slighted him 
because of his non-noble birth. Sallust incorporated this bias into 
his story of the Jugurthine War. Modern interpretation of Sallust's 
work must inc.lude an examination of Sallust's concept of virtus, for it 
profoundly affected his interpretation of Roman history. Virtus to 
Sallust was the motivation for a man's performance of outstanding 
13 deeds; it was the ideal of Roman republican behavior. To Sallust 
virtus was innate to the individual; it was not an inheritance from 
14 
noble birth, but could be possessed by anyone. This view of virtus 
allowed the novi homines to vie with nobles on an individual basis. 
According to Sallust's definition, virtus legitimatized the political 
struggle of men from non-consular families. 
In accordance with the political view of virtus, deviation from 
dedication to state service constituted moral degeneration, The 
political upheaval of the Gracchi occurred a decade before Rome's 
involvement in the Jugurthine War. In Sallust's view the crisis re-
' presented by the Gracchi was the result of moral degeneration. In 
this moralistic interpretation, political and economic crises were 
translated into moral crises. 15 To Sallust, the disappearance of 
foreign rivalry with Carthage allowed the Roman nobility to become 
corrupted and obsessed by avarice; therefore, the Republic began to 
d 1 . 16 ec i.ne. Actually army revolts and the corruption of provincial 
governors existed prior to 146, but Sallust ignored this. 17 In per-
ceiving the Republic's crisis as moral degeneration, he also ignored 
' 
the eccnomic factors which produced the growth of ~tifundia, large 
5 
estates, and the displacement of the small farmer who, in turn, swelled 
18 
the urban mob. 
In this political context, it is obvious why Sallust viewed the 
Jugurthine War as momentous. Throughout the war this moralistic his-
torian portrayed most nobles as corrupt, greedy, incompetent, and 
bribable--all the elements which, in his view, were destroying the 
19 
Republic. As a result of this corruption and incompetence, the plebs 
and equites asserted themselves politically agairlst the dominant 
Senate and imposed their will; they elected a non-noble, Marius, con-
su1. 20 Thus the conflict which the Senate could not conclude was en-
trusted to a novus .h2!!!£ to end. The success of Marius proved Sallust 
was correct in his thesis that the incompetent and degenerate nobles 
who had abandoned the virtus of their ancestors should not remain un-
challenged in Roman politics. 
Sallust's concept of virtus.is fundamental to the interpretation 
and critical analysis of the Bellum Iugurthinum, for in accordance with 
6 
this concept, he wrote this monograph to expose the corruptibility and 
incompetence of the nobility and the subsequent rise of the novi 
h . 21 om1nes. This ancient moralist attributed political sins to the 
nobility because they no longer dedicated their lives to the goal of 
their ancestors--virtus. Because of this preconceived bias, Sallust 
22 
sacrificed facts to insure the acceptance of his thesis. Believing 
moral degeneration to be the cause of the crisis faced by the Republic, 
23 
Sallust ignored political, social, and economic problems. He also 
ignored the role of party politics in the careers of the Gracchi and 
Marius; regarding political manipulation as unimportant, he could elim-
inate discussion of these factors without injuring his monograph. 24 
Sallust simply assigned the role of villain, thief, and fool to 
almost all nobles, and retained the hero's lines for Marius--the 
symbol of the rising equites. Consistently, Sallust portrayed the 
nobility as guilty of ambitio and avaritia. 25 He tells his audience 
that Jugurtha bribed the Senate not to declare war; that Aemilius 
Scaurus, the princeps of the Senate, and Calpurnius Bestia, a Roman 
general, were bribed by Jugurtha into a dishonorable peace; and that 
Quintus Caecilius Metellus, a member of an influential Roman family, 
26 
was a capable but arrogant man. Modern scholars have raised many 
objections to Sallust's assessment of the nobility. Their interpre-
tations and objections will be presented in the textual discussion of 
27 
each topic. 
Just as Salllust exposed the dark side of the nobility, he pro-
vided Marius, his hero, with the political opportunity to bring the 
faults of the nobility into the daylight. At first Marius was in-
sulted by Metellus; in Sallust's perspective, Metellus, the arrogant 
7 
aristocrat, scorned Marius for his non-noble birth. 28 In Sallust's 
biased treatment, the arrogance of Metellus became a characteristic of 
the nobility and conveniently fitted into his theme. Undaunted Marius 
campaigned for the consulship, employing the political weapon of the 
invective--speeches to discredit an opponent with false information. 
In these speeches Marius accused the nobility of corruption; such 
speeches provided Sallust with another opportunity to inject his poli-
. 1 b. 29 tic a ia s. Most speeches in the monograph are, in fact, the pro-
. 30 duct of Sallust's interpretation and are not verbatim transcripts. 
There is agreement among modern critics that Sallust made many 
errors in the Bellum Iugurthinum. However, there is disagreement 
concerning why those errors occurred. Some critics believe Sallust's 
main purpose in writing about the war with Jugurtha was to present 
the public with a political pamphlet, highlighting the inanity of the 
nobility and, conversely, the uprightness of such novi homines as 
Marius. To achieve acceptance of his theory, Sallust purposefully 
distorted chronology to suit his preconceived thesis. 31 
Another school of critics does not hold Sallust accountable for 
the facts. M. Holroyd views Sallust's monograph more in the genre of 
an historical novel in which facts could be moulded for the benefit 
of the plot, while Ronald Syme vindicates Sallust c;,f malicious intent 
by crediting errors to lack of thought or purposeful elimination of 
32 
detail. In Hugh Last's view, Sallust was not concerned with details 
of chronology or geography since Rome, not Numidia or the war itself, 
33 
was the real. topic of the Bellum Iugurthinum. Despite any explana-
tions, there are two major chronological distortions in Sallust's his-
tory. The first occurs in the chronology of Jugurtha's return from 
8 
Spain and his adoption by Micipsa; the second concerns the years that 
Marius campaigned in Africa. These errors will be discussed further 
in the text. 
Sallust drew upon many sources for information on the Jugurthine 
War; this multiplicity of sources may to some degree account for his 
34 
errors. While in Africa Sallus.t gathered information from African 
sources; he also could rely upon the memoirs of the Romans who served 
in Spain and Numidia. P. Sempronius Asellio, a military tribune to 
Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia, wrote Res Gestae, which was available 
35 
to Sallust. The Memoirs of Sulla, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, and 
Publius Rutilius Rufus were likewise extant when Sallust wrote the 
Bellum Iugurthinum. 36 Sallust turned to Cato the Elder and Thucydides 
for stylistic models, which left him liable to charges that he had 
plagiarized their material. 37 
Sallust wrote about a period of Roman history which, despite 
his monograph, will remain historically controversial. Politics and 
political factions after the Gracchi are not discussed sufficiently 
by primary sources. Consequently there appears a gap in the political 
history of Rome between the Gracchi and the emergence of the politi-
cian-generals who were the catalysts for the fall of the Republic. The 
Jugurthine War takes place during this chasm of Roman political his-
tory. Modern sources are beginning to offer political, social, and 
economic interpretations for the changes suffered by the Republic dur-
ing this political era. Ernst Badian compared the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century interpretation of this period to a " ••• patch-
work ••• held together by generalizations based on no evidence. u3 8 The 
recent employment of prosopography has illuminated some political 
9 
alliances, but it still remains that Roman politics immediately before 
and during the Jugurthine War is an area open to new and controversial 
39 
interpretations. 
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CHAPTER II 
A SYNOPSIS OF ROMAN POLITICS FROM THE GRACCHI 
TO THE JUGURTHINE WAR 
The political maneuvers during the Jugurthine War cannot be 
appreciated without observing their precedent in the Gracchan upheav-
al. Before the Gracchi the Roman government, although in name a 
republic, was actually controlled by the Senate under the direction of 
a few noble families. The constitution of the Republic was not 
altered to accommodate this; the senators used the political machinery 
at hand to control the Roman state. The senators were men of consular 
families who formed part of the landed aristocracy and whose primary 
function was to govern the state. These nobles did not form the en-
tire upper class of Roman Society; they shared this distinction with 
the equites, who were also members of the landed aristocracy, but 
1 
were separated from the senators by their commerci~l pursuits. The 
lex Claudia of 218 forbade senators from engaging in commerce; this 
allowed the·equites to exploit commerce, banking, and public con-
2 
tracts. The senatorial class provided the officers and magistrates 
for the Republic and eventually dominated the government through its 
authority. To control the state, the Senate manipulated the two major 
assemblies, the comitia plebis tributa and the comitia centuriata. 
The comitia plebis tributa or concilium plebis was a legislative 
. 3 
assembly comprised of the Roman tribes. The Roman state was divided 
by geographical boundaries into thirty-five tribes: four tribes con-
sisted of the urban population of Rome, with the remaining thirty-one 
13 
14 
4 tribes comprising the rura 1 population. In 241 the number of tribes 
5 
became fixed, and new voters were enrolled into old tribes. The vo-
ting procedure of the comitia tributa required a majority of the thirty-
five tribes, not a majority of the voters, to pass legislation. Obvi-
ously the procedure of tribal rather than individual voting diminished 
6 
the urban voters' power. 
Although the votes of individual tribesmen were of equal weight, 
the fact that rural tribes outnumbered urban tribes seven to one en-
7 
sured the predominance of the rural voters. With the increase in 
8 distance from the city, the rural votes became more important. If 
only a few voters from a rural tribe traveled to Rome, their votes de-
termined the vote for that tribe. 9 Rural voters were summoned to 
; . 
Rome by the great politicians who commanded their 10;1alty; it was 
these manipula tee voters who controlled the passage of legislation. 
Therefore, it was the rural tribes, influenced by the great senatorial 
10 
families, which determined the voting in the comitia tributa. 
While the comitia tributa was primarily a legislative assembly, 
the most important elective assemly was the comitia centuriata, or 
centuriate assembly, which chose the consuls and praetors. The cen-
turiate assembly consisted of the members of the Roman centuries, which 
were divided upon the basis of wealth into five classes. The first 
class contained the wealthiest men--senators and equites. The election 
of magistrates by the centuriate assembly was not democratic since 
the election of candidates was determined by the votes of the first 
11 
class of voters. · 
The mechanism for popular control of the government was available 
constitutionally to the common citizens of Rome. Technically, legisla-
tion with popular support could be introduced by the tribunes into 
15 
the comitia tributa, and, if passed, this legislation would b'e binding 
upon the entire state. However, such popular initiation did not occur; 
12 
instead, the aristocracy dominated the government. The complexity of 
ruling Ro~e had greatly increased since the beginning of the Republic; 
by 145 Rome's dominions were encircling the Mediterranean, and the 
comitia tributa was not accustomed to ruling such vast territories. 
The Senate evolved through tradition ana custom into the dominant 
governing body. It had directed Rome through the Hannibalic wars and 
assumed the authority for Rome's finances and foreign affairs. Re-
taining this authority, the Senate became entrenched in its role in 
the government by the increased complexity of governing the provinces 
and managing the intricate alliance system erected by Rome with foreign 
13 governments. The senators, of course, did not disdain their increas-
ing importance to the state. They were professional politicians, 
statesmen, and army commanders; by tradition, their purpose was to 
govern the state. Since men of wealth and noble birth were considered 
better suited to govern, Rome was, in fact, a timocratic oligarchy. 
Only members of the senatorial and equestrian orders were allowed to 
• be candidates for the magistracies; this was the order of Roman poli-
14 
tical life and was accepted by the Romans. 
The real political power in Rome emanated from approximately 
twenty consular families. From these families came the magristrates, 
15 generals, and important senators. This select group controlled the 
government by usurping the power of the apathetic populus. The Senate 
controlled foreign affairs by appointing provincial magistrates and 
military commanders. It usurped from the populus the rights of declar-
16 
ing war, accepting peace, and ratifying treaties. The tribunes 
16 
became instruments of the Senate instead of defenders of the populus. 17 
This extra-constitutional domination of the Senate was accepted by the 
18 populus and became traditional. 
The consular families controlled the tribal assembly through the 
system of clientelae. Roman citizens of a lesser rank than the con-
sular families were brought into a client-patron relationship. The 
client provided support and votes for his patron, and correspondingly, 
19 
the patron pledged to protect his client. In the case of the urban 
plebs, the patron often provided the livelihood for his clients. This 
practice increased as small farmers abandoned their land and fled 
to the city. The client-patron relationship expanded into Roman for-
eign affairs as well. Individual generals and senators acquired 
foreign clients primarily through conquest and service. A defeated 
nation became the client of the conquering general; the same relation-
ship existed between the Roman provinces and their governors. Politic-
ians acquired foreign clients through services such as granting 
20 
communities Roman citizenship or founding cities. 
Since there were no organized parties to aid nobles in elections, 
clients added to their prestige and power. Elections were won by 
21 personal relationsh~ps, such as client-patron and familial contacts. 
Political power centered in those consular families who were presti-
gious and controlled numerous clients--including both citizens and 
foreigners. In addition, clients were hereditary; they belonged to 
the noble's family and were expected to support all members of that 
22 
family. 
To the Roman noble the most important aspiration in life was to 
23 
attain power and glory. Political service to the state was the best 
17 
avenue to achieve these goals. Since there was no political party 
system in Rome, nobles formed politica 1 alliances to further their 
individual or group careers. The pyramid of a nohle's support for 
elective office began at the top with the noble's family; this in-
eluded relatives by blood, marriage, and adoption. Clients and sol-
diers, if the noble had held a coi:nmand, formed the base of the pyramid. 
Often this was not sufficient support to win one of the few political 
offices Rome offered; consequently, families joined into short-term 
24 
alliances to enhance the candidacy of their members. Such an a lli-
ance was called an amicitia or a coitio. 25 
The terms factio or pars designated a more permanent alliance 
with the accomplishment of a particular goal as the purpose of the 
alliance. Pars was the term used by Cicero to describe the political 
alliance of the Gracchan era, while Sallust chose factio to describe 
the alliance after the Gracchi. The different choices are significant. 
Factio denominatively means the same as pars, but connotatively factio 
acquired the definition of a conspiracy to dominate all other groups 
. 26 
and exclude them from power. Roman politics thus became a war of 
factions, each striving to dominate the state for ultimate power. The 
factions eventually reached a status quo in power; for each faction's 
attempt to increase its power, another faction was equally determined 
to offset the other's advantage. Reform or change was opposed since 
it could mean that one faction might lose the allegi~:nce of its 
27~ I 
clients or another become enhanced by new clients. Thus the 'lenate s 
primary concern was the maintenance of the factional stalemate. 
Factional intrigues did continue however; Donald Earl described 
Roman politics as a ceaseless struggle for " ••• position, prestige 
18 
28 
and power." To control politics, a faction had to control the magis-
terial elections and,therefore, the people who voted. The noble's 
clients became pawns in these political battles. The necessity of 
controlling the voters made the Senate resistant to change, especially 
29 
to the admittance of new voters who might upset the system. 
It is especially significant to note that the Senate's constitu-
tional position was only advisory; its ascendancy in government rested 
. 1 . i 1 30 upon socia organizat on, not aw. The plebs accepted the leadership 
of the nobility and the traditional ideas of~' honorable service 
to the state, and auctoritas, prestige acquired by a successful mag-
istracy. 31 The nobility had traditionally represented these ideals in 
government. The leadership of the Roman state, especially after the 
addition of the provinces, brought increasing wealth and power to the 
nobles. Senators, conscious of their advantageous position, became 
more resolute to retain it. Power, wealth, and glory rather than fides 
and dignitas became the motivation for the oligarchs. 32 
After the Secona Punic War, Rome's economy and political responsi-
bilities changed drastically. Wealth in the form of booty from the 
East flooded Rome, thereby creating an inflationary economy. The de-
population of the Italian countryside, which occurred during the Hanni-
balic wars, caused an influx to the city. In addition to these changes, 
the Senate now had the responsibility of governing a world empire. 
These changes, in Sallust's moralistic view, represented a serious 
33 
moral crisis to the Republic. 
In Sallust's terminology, the ideal of virtus was abandoneo 
by the aristocracy. Earl dates the decline of virtus to the Spanish 
Wars. When the Senate, through its chosen commanders, could not end 
19 
these extremely unpopular wars, factions utilized this opportunity 
1 . . 1 34 to create po 1t1ca unrest. The old idea of virtus, the interest 
of the state above that of the individual, was reversed for the fac-
35 tion's political advantage. Even the plebs took advantage of the 
upheaval by voting into law a proposal which provided for secret 
balloting in magisterial elections. This reform weakened the system 
of clientelae, for with this change, the client's loyalty was no lon-
ger a matter of public notice. 36 
Just as challenges to Rome's traditional politics began, its 
agrarian economy was revoluticnized by Rome's territorial expansion. 
The conquest of the Mediterranean greatly enriched the senatorial and 
equestrian classes. The senatorial class provided the officers who 
collected the booty after victories, while the equestrian class pro-
fited from supplying the army.37 The most significant economic change 
was produced by the administration of the provinces; provincial com-
mands replaced agriculture as the chief source of income for the no-
,' 38 
bility. The senators needed cash for their political careers; 
appropriate bribes to tribesmen and jurymen were often a necessity for 
a successful career. Such cash was acquired through the exploitation 
39 
of the provinces by their governor. 
Although technically restricted from trade, the nobility invested 
in the equestrian trading companies. 40 The senators and equites also 
invested in land; enormous estates, latifundia, farmed by slave labor, 
were formed throughout Italy. The growth of the latifundia caused 
increasing displacement of small farmers,' who choked the city. 41 This 
increase in wealth created a larger gap between the upper class and 
the plebs. The desire to maintain this gap led th~ Senate to ignore 
the agrarian land problem which was eventually championed by the 
42 Gracchi. 
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During the second half of the second century, many peasant swelled 
Rome 1 s urban population. The peasant farmers who flocked to the city 
were products of war and the advancement of agricultural techniques. 
Many small farmers were driven from their plots by the Hannibalic wars, 
and, as the century progressed, the small farmers served in various 
wars which further reduced their numbers. The products from the de-
pleted soil of the Italian farms could not compete with the grain 
produced in the provinces; a further agricultural obstacle to the far-
mer were the latifundia. 43 Many large estates were converted to the 
production of grapes and olives, but the small farmer lacked the capi-
tal for such conversion and again could not compete, especially against 
44 
the slave labor of the latifundia. To the peasant farmer there were 
advantages in abandoning his land. Without property, the small farmer 
did not satisfy the property requirement for the levy and could not 
be drafted. In addition, many farmers who served in Greece and Asia 
may have become more cosmopolitan and found their small plots of land 
45 
uninviting. 
In Rome these peasants could find employment with the suppliers 
of public contracts or in the construction of state funded works. 46 
Booty from the fall of Carthage and Corinth provided funds for govern-
ment expenditures on public works such as temples and aqueducts. This 
ecnomic expansion drew peasants from the countryside to provide labor-
ers. However, the economy of Rome was commensurate with government 
expenditure; and when the booty money was depleted, government contra~ts 
were curtailed. Consequently, there occurred an economic recession 
47 
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which resulted in widespread unemployment. The lack of other ave-
nues of employment besides contractual government work increased un-
employment. Industry in Rome was not highly developed, and most 
. . h 1 1 48 artisans were eit er s aves or ex-s aves. 
Another threat to the economic stability of Rome was the Sicilian 
Slave War. Sicily provided much of Rome's urban grain supply, but 
the slave revolt interrupted the collection of the•grain tithe, result-
49 
ing in rising grain prices for Rome. This was the immediate economic 
crisis which Tiberius Gracchus sought to alleviate. The economic 
dissatisfaction of the urban peasants was politically disconcerting to 
the senatorial regime. As peasants migrated from the country, tradi-
tional ties with the aristocracy were broken, and although they now 
resided in the city, these former rural dwellers still voted in the 
rural tribes. These politically unattached rural tribesmen added a 
chaotic element to politics. 50 
In addition to the economic problems staggering Rome, the retreat 
from rural life precipitated a military crisis. Rome's increasing 
power and prestige often demanded numerous military commitments. From 
the Hannibalic wars to 133, Rome fielded at least eight legions per 
51 Small farmers returning from duty often found their plots year. so 
deteriorated that they abandoned them for urban dwelling. 52 The re-
duction in the number of small farmers resulted in a similar decline 
in the number of men available for the draft. The requirement of pro-
perty ownership dwindled the number of potential soldiers as farmers 
53 flocked into the city. The levy became very unpopular, especially 
for wars which offered no booty, so escape to the city became a popular 
54 
avenue for avoiding the draft. This crisis in potential recruits 
was the primary reason proposed by T. Gracchus for his agrarian 
55 
reforms. During this domestic crisis, the Senate's chief concern 
22 
was foreign affairs; that body became static and resisted change and 
criticism. 56 It became increasingly vulnerable to factional battles, 
57 
and was especially devastated by the program of Gracchus. 
A reform faction of which T. Gracchus was a member planned the 
ascendancy of their factio during this domestic crisis. In 134 
certain senatoria 1 families began to prepare an alliance which would 
I 
place them foremost among the factions. They plan~ed to have a member 
of their faction elected tribune and to also assure the election of 
58 friendly consuls. The mission of the tribune was to secure the 
passage of an agrarian reform bill to ease the military crisis by 
re-establishing the class of landowning farmers. 59 The consuls were 
to aid in controlling the Senate which would undoubtedly oppose such 
60 
a proposal. The members of this faction were from the Claudii 
Pulchri, Sempronii Gracchi, and Mucii Scaevolae families. Also 
attached to this group~e the Fulvii, Calpurnii Pisones, and perhaps 
the Manlii; these families, however, coutributed less than a total 
. h 1 f h ~ . 61 commitment to t e goa s o t e taction. 
The tribune who was to champion the agrarian reform was Tiberius 
Gracchus. His law, the lex Sempronia, revived the Licinio-Sextian 
rogations which limited the amount of ager publicus an individual could 
hold to five. hundred iugera, plus an additional two hundred and fifty 
62 
per son µp to a limit of one thousand iugera. Tiberius bypassed the 
Senate and brought the law before the concilium plebis--a deviation 
from normal practices. Traditionally, the Senate approved bills before 
23 
they were taken up by the concilium, and Tiberius' departure from this 
method alienated his senatorial supporters. In the concilium another 
tribune, Octavius, vetoed any action on the agrarian proposal. Without 
precedent, Tiberius called upon the concilium to depose Octavius and 
elect another tribune; the plebs assented to this and the lex Sempronia 
63 
became law. To finance the distribution of land', Tiberius used the 
I 
money left to the Roman Republic in the will of At:alus III, a client 
64 
of his family. 
While the actions of Tiberius bordered upon unconstitutionality, 
65 he actually broke no laws. Nevertheless, his actions did cause a 
tremendous political upheaval. Tiberius rejuvenated the powers of the 
tribunate. The tribunate had become a tool of the Senate, but now it 
again had the potential for state leadership through the initiation of 
66 
legislation. Likewise the concilium plebis could acquire more re-
sponsibility for governing. Traditionally foreign affairs and finances 
were the sole responsibility of the Senate; Tiberius invaded the Sen-
ate' s prerogative when the concilium decided upon the disposition of 
the will of Attalus. The threat to the Senate's control of foreign 
affairs was perhaps the most ominous; the action of the concilium set 
a precedent for interference by the plebs in foreign affairs. 67 The 
Senate was .also threatened by the deposition of Octavius, for its tra-
ditional means of controlling the concilium were destroyed by this. 68 
The Senate was determined to eliminate these "revolutionary" practices. 
When Tiberius ran for re•election to a second tribunate, pontifex 
maximus P. Scipio Nasica led a mob which killed Tiberius and three 
69 
hundred of his followers. 
In 123 the brother of Tiberius, Gaius, became tribune and em-
24 
barked upon a political career which equalled or surpassed his brother's· 
in the degree of political unrest he created. He continued to support 
the redistribution of land to the propertyless. His main support was 
drawn from the rural laborers living in Rome. As family plots shrunk 
with the divisions for sons, farmers could not sustain a livelihood~ 
They drifted to the city and hired on for the harvest of large estates, 
or became tenants on the latifundia. Since the urban population was 
not interested in agrarian reform, the support for the Gracchi came 
70 from the dislocated rura 1 poor. 
The proposals of G. Gracchus seriously eroded the superiority 
of the Senate. In 123 he fixed cheap grain prices for the poor, an 
act which cut into the Senate's system of voter control; previously 
candidates had arranged for grain distributions as a bribe to win 
71 
votes. Gaius also carried a law which forced the Senate to declare 
which provinces would be consular before the consuls for that year 
were elected. This hindered the Senate's former practice of awarding 
choice provinces to their favorites and assigning insignificant com-
mands to popular consuls. There was, however, an article stating 
. 72 that tribunes could not interfere with the decision of the Senate. 
The most devastating change Gaius imposed upon the Senate was 
the transfer of the extortion courts from senatorial to equestrian 
jurors. Previously the senators had appointed the jurors; but in 122 
jurors were chosen from an album of four hundred and fifty equites. 73 
From this number, jurors for the standing courts and special commissions 
were chosen. 'Tile transfer of the courts bestowed new political power 
upon the equites; in addition, Gaius also awarded them the right to 
farm the taxes of Asia. Wealthy equites, through their companies, bade 
25 
for the right to farm the taxes, and made their profit in the collec-
tion of the taxes in the province. Since the equites controlled the 
courts of repetundae, or extortion, they could threaten any governor 
74 
who interferred with their methods. 
It might appear that this elevation in the political power of 
the equites would bring them into conflict with the Senate. However, 
the equites~shared property interest with the senators and supported 
75 
them except when their policies infringed upon the equites' profits. 
The equites, like the senators, had no sympathy for the condition of 
76 
the poor and did not support T. Gracchus. Further, as the support 
of Gaius began to erode over his championship of Latin citizenship, 
77 
the equites responded to the appeals of the Senate and abandoned him. 
The Senate issued the senatus consultum ultimum authorizing the 
consul L. Opinius to protect the state from Gaius and his supporters. 
In the ensuing melee, Gaius died and three thousand of his followers 
were executed by Opimius without a trial. 78 The Senate had found a 
new weapon to slience its opposition; in the next forty years of 
Republican history, that assembly authorized its "extreme decree" three 
79 
times and each time it resulted in a tribune's death. 
The program of the Graccpi was an ominous portent of the Republic's 
future. After the Gracchi, the equites had new political power and the 
tribunate, as an instrument of public expression, was restored, but 
80 
most significantly the weakness of the Senate was forever revealed. 
The Senate feared the Gracchi 1 s use of the populace and the uncontroll-
81 
ability of the city masses~ Some historians judge the Gracchi 
responsible for the decline of the Republic. They believe that the 
Gracchi shattered the balance of constitutional and unconstitutional 
26 
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power upon which the Republic functioned. H. H. Scullard professed 
that while the Gracchi were not revolutionaries, they " ••• precipi-
83 
tated the revolution that overthrew the Republic." The program of 
the Gracchi, whether intentional or otherwise, did produce a revolu-
ti on within the government which eroded the Repub lie 1 s foundation. 
The program of G. Gracchus produced a permanent:, volatile new 
force in Roman politics, one that disrupted the old balance of power 
through which the Senate had dominated the state. This new force was 
the order of the equi;\:es; previously the equites had represented the 
non-political segment of the upper class. The equites, besides provid-
ing officers for the army, were engaged in business and agriculture 
and traditionally were excluded from major political offices. By 
the lex Claudia of 218, senators and their sons were proscribed from 
owning a vessel which could carry more than three hundred amphorae, a 
non-commercial sized cargo. The object of the law was to exclude the 
senatorial class from commerce; this produced a void which was filled 
84 by the equestrian class. 
In addition to this commercial avenue opened to them, the equites 
were also a quasi-civil service for the state. Rome had no official 
designated to collect taxes in provinces or erect public works. These 
functions and others were accomplished through a contract system. 
The state awarded contracts to the highest bidder; the usual bidders 
85 
were from the equestrian class and the publicani. The publicani 
formed joint stock companies to amass sufficient capital to complete 
their contracts; although barred from commerce, senators purchased 
shares in these companies. The companies were not permanent corporate 
structures but were organized for the completion of a particular 
27 
contract. 86 Besides public contracts, the equestrian class also en-
gaged in banking, trading, and money lending. 87 In addition to busi-
ness concerns, the equites were the officers or cavalry class for the 
Republic; the censor chose eighteen hundred men to be equites and hold 
88 
the public horse. 
Despite their reputation as businessmen, equites were principally 
landowners. Agriculture, not business, was the primary source of 
income in Italy. Land was the safest investment for thea:iuites and 
also provided the necessary security for state contracts. Th~anded 
equites did have political significance; their votes in Rome's timo-
cratic assemblies carried special importance. However, the Senate 
overshadowed the power of the equites, for it had the power to cancel 
or modify state contracts, a right which represented potential econom-
ic disaster for them. Additionally, in the pre-Gracchan era the 
Senate controlled the extortion courts, and thereby limited the 
equestrian prosecution of provincial governors.89 
The political influence of the publicani was slight since they 
were not an organized pressure group; however, they 1id challenge the 
90 Senate over the terms of state contracts. Nevertheless, there was. 
not constant conflict between the publicani and the Senate; the Senate 
was not zealous in overseeing the profits made by the equites on gov-
91 
ernment contracts, so disputes were not continuous. However, after 
the Gracchi the equites had more power in the government, and, accord-
ingly, conflicts with the Senate increased. 92 
According to E. Badian, the followers of T. Gracchus searched for 
new support after his death add chose the equestrian order for their 
political ally. After the death of T. Gracchus, the Senate coalesced 
28 
into a unit opposed to reform. It was then that the advocates of 
reform began to implement a plan designed to separate the equites from 
the class of the nobles and create a new identity for them. Badian 
cites two laws in 129 which began this division of the upper class. 
In that year a law passed which forced men to surrender their public 
horse, the symbol of equestrian status, upon becoming senators; another 
law designated fourteen rows of seats at the games for equestrian use. 
Both of these laws were public indications of the emergence of a new 
class in Rome. Previously the equites had not seriously challenged the 
Senate's authority or demanded political rights; however, the plans of 
the Gracchan faction would bestow new privileges and opportunities 
which made them conscious of their additional political importance. 
Significantly the question of Italian citizenship also grew from the 
Gracchan reforms. Protection from the land commission's justice 
spurred the Italians to seek the privileges of Roman citizenship. 93 
The emergence of these interest groups, products of the Gracchan 
reforms, would drastically alter traditional Roman politics. The 
Gracchan faction had created a special class of wealthy citizens and 
94 hoped to win their allegiance by giving them political power. 
In 122 or 123 G. Gracchus awarded the collection of Asian taxes 
to the publicani. Not only was this a tremendous amount of money but 
95 
it set a precedent for the taxation of provinces yet to be acquired. 
The revenue law doubled the amount of contracts the state awarded, 
and merchants became increasingly fascinated with the profits to be 
made in the provinces. 96 Increased political power augmented the new 
wealth which the equites inherited from G. Gracchus; the Gracchan fac-
97 
tion hoped that this new power would support them. That faction 
-also provided the equites with the means to retainlng the money ex-
torted from the province--the control of the repetundae courts. 
G. Gracchus had a dual purpose in securing the passage of the 
judiciary law of 123. The remova 1 of the extortion courts from the 
Senate's control would limit the excesses of provincial magistrates, 
and therefore, return the senatorial class to its task of managing 
98 
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the government. It would also provide the newly s~parated equestrian 
1 . h . 1 f . 99 c ass wit an important governmenta unction. Before the judiciary 
law of 123 the Senate controlled the awarding of contracts and made up 
the jury for trials in which governors, also from the senatorial class, 
were tried for extortion. After Gracchus, the equites formed the jury 
for such trials; the potential threat of prosecution by equites made 
100 
the governors more compliant with them in the provinces. Moreover, 
the equites were given insurance against senatorial backlash; in the 
judiciary law there was a clause immunizing the jury from prosecution 
101 
on bribery charges. 
According to the judiciary law, those excluded from juries were 
senators, magistrates, ex-magistrates, and their relatives. Equestrian 
status for the jury probably was determined by wealth and not restric-
ted to those holding the public horse. Qualification by wealth would 
have broken some of the social prejudice among equites; it was tradi-
tionally more respectable for equites to engage in agriculture rather 
than trading. 102 A more cohesive class of equites emerged with new 
wealth and political power. Unfortunately for the Gracchan faction, 
they could not control the volati1e allegiance of the equestrian 
103 
order. 
The economic interest of the equestrian order accounts for this 
30 
political instability; the equites were both men of landed wealth and 
business concerns. They often a 11ied with senator;; when their landed 
investments were threatened and against the Senate in conflicts over 
104 
contracts. In addition to common agricultural interests, the 
equites shared a commercial interest with senators. Although tech-
nically barred from commercial pursuits, the senatorial class, often 
acting through equestrian middlemen, engaged in money lending and wine 
105 
and oil exportation to pay for imported luxury items. The equites 
were not a pressure group in constant opposition to the Senate; however, 
there were points of contention between the orders. All equites were 
determined to retain their most important political weapon--the control 
of the extortion courts. Within the equestrian order, the most voci-
106 
ferous group was the publicani. 
Since the equestrian jurors usually came from the ranks of the 
107 
publicani, they gained political importance after the Gracchi. 
Traditionally the publicani and the equites were excluded from politi-
108 
cal office due to social prejudice and their business concerns. 
Therefore, the political clout of the publicani was not overwhelming 
109 
and the Senate was not frightened by them. To the primarily agra-
rian aristocrats, the trading and financia 1 activities of the equites 
were regarded as degrading occupations. 110 The desire for prestige 
and auctoritas motivated the equites to retain md use their new 
political power; their main source of political prestige flowed from 
111 
their control of the extortion courts. Many of the disputes 
after 123 between the Senate and the equestrian order resulted from 
senatorial efforts to remove the equites from these courts. The 
31 
equites resented the arrogance of the nobility and their monopolization 
112 
of political offices. 
In short, the Gracchan faction created a new class and bribed 
its support with the Asian taxes and the repetundae courts. It is 
difficult to assess the effect the equites had upon the state becuase, 
in R. Syme 1 s words, "The knights preferred comfort, secret power and 
solid profit to the burdens, the dangers and the extravagant display 
of a senator's life. 11113 That element of "secret power" lends an aura 
of the mysterious to the power of the equites and opens the door to 
historians' interpretation. On the equites use of their political 
weapon, the extortion courts, they have been exonerated from blatant 
114 
miscarriages of justice. While unable to determine the exact 
limits of the equites' power, perhaps that objective can be achieved 
by discussing what power they did not have. The equites, in general, 
115 
accepted the foreign policy of the Senate. After G. Gracchus the 
political power of the merchants greatly increased due to their 
collection of the Asian taxes. Their added importance was, however, 
insufficient to motivate the Senate to direct a full-scale campaign 
116 
to eliminate the pirates of the Mediterranean. The equites cannot 
be blamed for goading the Senate into wars for the extension of their 
tax collection; evidence that the Senate checked the publicani is 
that the Sicilian grain tithe was still collected by Sicilians in 70. 117 
Though the equites did have political limitations, they were the 
"swing" element in Roman politics. The equites could support the fac-
tion leading the plebs and thereby seriously challenge the dominance 
of the Senate as they did with G. Gracchus; however, if the equites 
supported the senatorial order, the popular faction would fall to 
32 
the domination of the Senate as it did when the e'quites refused to 
118 
support the final actions of G. Gracchus. The equites supported 
the group which best represented their interests--an attitude which 
was destined to disrupt the functioning of the Republic. 
Following the deaths of the Gracchi, the Senate resumed control 
of the state. Rather than being strengthened by its victory over the 
Gracchi, the Senate had been weakened. That body now faced powerful 
new interest blocs--the plebs, the equites, and the Italian aristocra-
119 
cy--all of whom clamored for political advantage. The response of 
the Senate to these political changes was a frantic desire to main-
120 
tain their former position in society. The old Gracchan faction 
• 
was without a leader and, more importantly, without a decisive plan; 
121 it therefore represented no current threat to the Senate. Since 
the constitution had not been amended in favor of the popular cause, 
the Senate struggled to assume its former position. However, the 
Senate was conscious of the smouldering power of the plebs and equites, 
and of its own tenuous hold on the predominant position in the 
122 
state. 
The Senate did not immediately institute the repeal of all 
Gracchan legislation; the distribution of grain continued, and the 
equites retained control of the extortion courts and the collection of 
123 
taxes in Asia. The land commission continued under the direction 
of G. Sulpicius Galba, G. Papirius Carbo, and L. Calpurnius Bestia, but 
124 
allotments ended under the law of Spurius Thorius in 118. The 
oligarchs lowered the salary of soldiers, a sum which the Gracchi 
had raised; however, the consul of 109 repealed the oligarchs' decision 
d . d h 1 . . d l" 125 an raise t e sa ary in an attempt to in uce more en istments. 
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In order to supplant domestic issues, the oligarchs of the restoration 
126 
government engaged the Roman state in numerous small wars. 
Domestic strife between 122 and the beginning of the Jugurthine 
War resulted from the factional struggle of the nobility; thus Rome 
127 
itself was in turmoil during this era of small foreign wars. After 
the nobles had disposed of the troublesome Gracchi, they again engaged 
in factional politics. The Scipiones had been in power before the 
Gracchi, but after their deaths a new faction headed by the Metelli 
128 
began a steady climb to power. The extortion court was used as 
a stage for factional battles; the main objective o,f these trials was 
129 
to discredit members of the opposing faction. Following the death 
of G. Gracchus, there were several cases prosecuted either for per-
sona 1 vengeance or factiona 1 advancement. 
P. Decius Subulo, tribune for 120, brought Lucius Opinius to 
trial on the charge that Opimius, as consul, had exc~eded his authority 
in the suppression and murder of the followers of G. Gracchus. Opimius 
was acquitted, but in the following year Decius was tried for accepting 
a bribe to prosecute Opimius; Decius was acquitted by a jury comprised 
. 130 
of equ1tes. Trials such as these represent political maneuvering, 
but Decius' motivation is difficult to ascertain. Scullard and T. 
Mommsen believe that Decius was an agent of the old Gracchan 
131 
faction. Their position is challenged by Badian and E. Gruen who 
agree that Decius was motivated by personal vengeance. The desire for 
revenge was perhaps initiated by mocking remarks made by the father of 
L. Opimius in reference to Decius' private life as a youth. The in-
dependence of Decius is also supported by the lack of evidence linking 
him to either the faction of Scipio Aemilianus or the Metelli. Gruen 
believes that the attack on Decius precipitated from an attempt to 
discredit the leaders of 121 and had no connection with the Gracchan 
132 
movement. 
34 
The acquittal of Opimius in 120 was a good omen for the restora-
tion government; it scored another victory in the saine year through 
tribune L. Calpurnius Bestia. Bestia sponsored a plebiscite which 
recalled P. Popillius Leanas, the leader of the specia 1 court which 
condemned the followers of T. Gracchus. The oligarchy appeared firmly 
established, but their security was shattered by continued factional 
133 
conflicts. 
After the death of G. Gracchus, P. Cornelius Lentulus, an ardent 
anti-Gracchan, became princeps senatus; however, factionalism in the 
Senate forced him to flee Rome as a legatio to Sicily. The factional 
war was then taken to the stage of the extortion courts. In 119, the 
same year as the trial of Decius, G. Papirius Carbo was tried before 
an equestrian jury; the charge against him is unknown, but it was 
perhaps related to his propraetorship. Carbo had an interesting 
political career; he was a member of the agrarian connnission with G. 
Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus. After their demise, Carbo apparently 
switched his allegiance to the anti-Gracchan faction and remained a 
member of the land commission on which Bestia and Galba served. 134 
In 120 Carbo successfully defended L. Opimius at his trial. 135 Carbo 
became an easy target for a faction desiring to embarrass his new all-
ies. L. Licinius Crassus successfully prosecuted him, and Carbo, 
apparently abandoned by his new backers, committed suicide. Signifi-
cantly, later in his career, L. Crassus was a member of the Metellan 
136 faction. 
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Following the Gracchi, a new power bloc began to emerge--one 
which would eventually become foremost in Roman government. This new 
faction was led by the family of the Metelli; the Metelli eventually 
replaced their opponents, the Scipiones and the anti-Gracchan extre-
mists.137 Factions were founded upon the leadership of great families 
and their ability to form alliances with influential families and 
individuals. The growth of the Metellan faction provides a good illus-
tration of the operation of factional politics. The family began its 
rise with Q. Caecilius Metellus, consul in 206, who had two sons, 
Q. Metellus Macedonicus, consul in 143, and L. Metellus Calvus, consul 
in 142. Q. Metellus Macedonicus had four sons, Q. Metellus Balearicus, 
consul in 123, L. Metellus Diadematus, consul in 117:, M. Metellus, 
consul in 115, and G. Metellus Caprarius, consul in 113. L. Metellus 
Calvus had two sons, L. Metellus Delmaticus, consul in 119, and Q. 
Metellus Numidicus, consul in 109. Obviously, the faction had ample 
138 family members to occupy Roman offices. The following is a list of 
the Metelli who held the offices of augur, praetor, consul, censor or 
pontifex maximus from 123-102; the promagistracies of the Metelli are 
also listed. This demonstrates how the faction maintained its politi-
139 
cal influence. 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Baliaricus consul 123 
L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus praetor 122 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Baliaricus promagis tra te 122 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Baliaricus promagistrate 121 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Baliaricus censor 120 
L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus praetor 120 
L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus consul ll9 
M. Caecilius Metellus praetor 118 
L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus promagis tra te ll8 
L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus consul 117 
G. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius praetor - ll7 
L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus promagistrate ll7 
L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus promagistrate 116 
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M. Caecilius Metellus consul ll5 
L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus censor ll5 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus augur ll5 
succeeded by Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus 
M. Caeci1ius Metellus promagistrate ll4 
L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus pontifex maximus 114-103 
G. Gaecilius Metellus Caprarius consul ll3 
M. Caecilius Metellus promagistrate ll3 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus praetor ll2 
M. Caecilius Metellus proma gis tra te 112 
G. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius promagis tra te ll2 
M. Caecilius Metellus promagis tra te lll 
G. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius promagistrate lll 
Q. Gaecilius Metellus Numidicus promagistrate 111 
Q. .Caecilius Metellus Numidicus consul 109 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus promagistrate 108 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus promagistrate 107 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus promagistrate 106 
and celebrated triumph 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus censor 102 
G. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius censor 102 
The ascendancy of the Metelli was aided by the large number of 
family members who were available to hold the consulship and by their 
successful military careers which added prestige to the family. As 
the Scipionic faction faded, its old members such as P. Scipio 
Nasica Serapio, son of the Nasica who led the mob against T. Gracchus, 
Q. Mucius Scaevola, and Q. Lutatius Catulus joined the ranks of the 
Metelli. The Metelli eventually won the support of the Servilii 
Caepiones, Aurelii Cottae, Mucii Scaevolae, Licinii ~rassi, Lutatii 
Catuli, Rutilii Rufi, Calpurnii Pisones, and perhaps the Livii Drusi. 
The faction not only enlisted the allegiance of the great noble hou-
ses of Rome, but also cultivated promising .!!2.Y! homines, such as M. 
·Aemilius Scaurus and c. Marius. The domination by the Metelli was 
not inunediate; their position was not superior to other factions until 
lll. 140 
The factional maneuvering displayed through the courts from 
116-113 illustrated the Metellan rise. M. Aemilius Scaurus was 
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a member of the Metellan factio; he was from a patrician family which 
was no longer prominent. The Metelli supported him for offices and 
also supported him in defending himself against factio enemies. In 
116 Scaurus was defeated by Q. Fabius Eburnus, a Scipionic follower. 
In 115 Scaurus defeated P. Rutilius Rufus, another Scipionic follower, 
for the consulship. A good example of the use of the courts to harass 
political opponents was demonstrated by this contest. After Scaurus 
won the election, Rutilius charged him with ambitus; Scaurus was 
acquitted and then prosecuted Rutilius. In 114 M. Junius Brutus, a 
political ally of Ooimius, charged Scaurus with extortion. Obviously, 
the Scipionic and anti-Gracchan factions did not disappear when chal-
lenged by the Metelli; these court trials show the continued factiona 1 
disturbances which underlied Roman politics. 141 Scaurus remained a 
successful member of the Metellan faction; he became princeps senatus 
and censor, and eventually married Caecilia Metella, the daughter of 
Metellus Delmaticus. 142 
Trials for factiona 1 advantage dU not end with Scaurus; 114 and 
113 were disturbing years in Roman politics. In 114 G. Porcius Cato 
was defeated in Thrace; this defeat alarmed the people, and Cato was 
charged with repetundae in 113. Cato was the son of M. Porcius Cato 
and Aemilia; although a nephew of Scipio Aemilianus, G. Cato had 
followed T. Gracchus and later became a member of the·Metellan faction. 
His prosecution was successfully supported by the old anti-Gracchan 
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faction; Cato was convicted but charged only a small sum. 
However, Cato's trial was almost insignificant in comparison to 
the scandal of the Vestal Virgins in 114 and 113. In 114 the daughter 
of an equite was killed by lightening; this event was interpreted by 
38 
soothsayers to indicate that the Vestal Virgins were no longer virgins. 
This began an investigation of the Vestals which was to become a fac-
tional free-for-all. The Vestals were members of some of Rome's most 
important houses; there was an Aemilia, a Licinia, and a Marcia. 
Pontifex maximus Metellus Delmaticus investigated the charges against 
the Vestals and condemned Aemilia while acquitting the others. This 
did not satisfy the populace of Rome who supported the plebiscite of 
tribune Sex. Peducaeus to establish a special court to try the Vestals 
who had been acquitted by the pontifex maximus; L. Cassius Longinus 
Ravilla was the prosecutor for this special court comprised of eques-
trian jurors. L. Licinius Crassus, son-in-law of Q. Mucius Scaevola, 
a member of the Metellan faction, defended his cousin Licinia, but 
Cassius was harsh in his prosecutions and the remaining Vestals were 
144 
condellll1ed. The Metellan factio, as calculated, was embarrassed by 
this outcome. Nevertheless, it was this faction which dominated the 
state at the outbreak of the Jugurthine War. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ORIGINS OF THE NUMIDIAN WAR 
The Second Punic War was the stimulus which originated Rome's 
interest in Numidia. This area, now Tunisia and Algeria, was inhabited 
by Berber tribesmen, and was part of the Carthaginia.h hegemony. The 
Carthaginian cavalry consisted of these Berber tribesmen; it was this 
fact which compelled Rome into diplomatic intrigues with the Numidian 
princes. 1 In order to deprive their rival of a cavalry, Roman generals 
arranged alliances with Berber kings. 
In 213 P. Scipio, the father of Scipio Africanus, arranged an 
alliance through envoys with Syphax, the king of the Masaesylii, who 
inhabited wester Numidia. Syphax began fighting the Carthaginians 
in North Africa and encouraging Numidians in the Carthaginian army in 
2 
Spain to desert. To combat the influence of Syphax, Carthage formed 
an alliance with Gaia, the king of the Massyles of eastern Numidia; he 
remained allied to Carthage from 213-208. Gaia 1 s son, Masinissa, led 
3 
a contingent of cavalry for the Carthaginians in Spain. Syphax's 
activities in northern Africa necessitated the return of Hasdrubal and 
Masinissa from Spain. Syphax was defeated, but not pacified, and Ma-
sinissa was assigned to continue fighting in Africa; eventually he 
forced Syphax into an alliance with Carthage and returned to Spain. 4 
Masinissa fought for Carthage in Spain from 211-206; in 206, however, 
he became receptive to the entreaties of Scipio for an alliance. 5 
A political shuffle in Numidia prompted Masinissa to seek an 
alliance in the Roman camp. While Masinissa was in Spain, his father 
47 
48 
had died in Africa; Masinissa 's uncle assumed the throne but died 
shortly. A dynastic struggle resulted in which a rival branch of the 
family .acquired the uppermost position. Carthage and their new ally, 
Syphax, opposed Masinissa's claim to the throne; Syphax planned to 
eventually usurp Masinissa' s kingdom. Masii:tissa met with Scipio in 
Spain and promised to aid the Romans in an invasion of Africa; after 
6 
this meeting, Masinissa returned to Africa. Scipio arrived in 
Africa in 204 with hopes of cementing an alliance with both Syphax 
and Masinissa; the loyalty of Masinissa was secured, btit any. hope of 
an alliance with Syphax was destroyed by his marriage to a 
7 Carthaginian. 
Masinissa, aided by Roman forces under Scipio's lieutenant, G. 
Laelius, began an invasion of Syphax's territory; Syphax was de-
8 
feated, and his capital, Cirta, surrendered. In 203 Laelius was 
dispatched to Rome with a moderate peace treaty for the Senate's 
ratification; in addition to ending hostilities, the treaty provided 
for the official recognition of Masimissa as the king of all Numidia. 
The Senate hesitated before approving the treaty because Hannibal was 
still in Italy, but eventually did ratify it. However, during the 
peace negotiations at Rome, the Carthaginians broke the truce, and 
the treaty never went into effect. 9 
Masinissa, again with Roman military aid, pacified Numidia and 
established his kinghom during the winter of 203-202. While Masi-
nissa was occupied in Numidia, the war between Rome and Carthage had 
revived. Hannibal began the battle at Zama in 202 before Masinissa 
and Laelius had returned from Numidia; however, they did arrive in 
49 
time to turn the tide of battle in favor of Scipio, and Zama was a 
10 Roman victory. 
After the Second Punic War, Masinissa was the sole sovereign of 
Numidia and owed his throne and his increased do~inion to Scipio Afri-
11 
ca nus. This African monarch brought dramatic changes to Numidia 
during his reign which lasted over fifty years. 'Educated by Carthag-
inians, Masinissa wished to impart Punic customs to his nomadic Numid-
ians. To accomplish this, he encouraged the Numidians to follow Punic 
agricultural methods and abandon their nomadic life and tribal govern-
12 
ment. However, Masinissa did not convert the Numidians into settled 
farmers; although his efforts did extend agriculture, the chief occu-
pation of his people remained stock-raising. Numidia did not engage 
in heavy foreign trade at this time; agricultural surpluses were used 
as political gifts. Masinissa was diligent in appeasing the Romans; 
he realized that Numidian prosperity hinged upon continued Roman 
13 
approval. Eventually, Masinissa was successful in transforming 
14 
Numidia into a unifed and powerful kingdom. 
One of the tools used by the Numidian king to forge a powerful 
state was the peace treaty which ended the Second Punic War. Accord-
ing to the treaty of 201 Carthage had to cede to Numidia the ancestral 
lands which it claimed up to a certain boundary which was to be defined, 
and further, Carthage could not wage an aggressive war without Roman 
permEssion. Since the boundary of Numidia's ancestral lands was never 
established, Masinissa had a perfect opportunity to seize prized 
Carthaginian territory. This was especially easy for Numidia since, 
according to the treaty, Carthage would be violating that agreement 
if it attacked the Numidians as they took possession of any land 
they claimed. Negotiation was the only recourse left to Carthage, 
and, in order to remain a favored client of Rome, Masinissa was 
15 
careful to accept Roman arbitration of his territorial claims. 
50 
Rome approved Numidia's piecemeal aggressioh either directly or 
' 16 through its silence during arbitration over disputed areas. Masi-
nissa's first encroachment was in 193; as a result Rome dispatched 
an arbitration connnission headed by Scipio Africanus, but no decision 
was reached. Since Masinissa held the area, he retained this former 
Carthaginian territory. The next disputed territory in 182 was awar-
ded to Masinissa by the Senate. In 174 Rome had to postpone a deci-
sion on another area because of more important business; Masinissa 
17 
again retained the territory. In 161 Masinissa acquired the fertile 
f i k i b h I • • 18 area o Empor a and ept t y t e Senate s permission. 
In Carthage a pro-Numidian party gained control of the government; 
it wished to unite Carthage and Numidia under Masinissa. This party, 
however, was short-lived and was replaced by a group favoring opposi-
tion to Numidian aggression. Masinissa 1 s invasion of the fertile 
area of Thugga aroused the Carthaginians to protest his actions to 
the Romans. In 152 M. Porcius Cato headed a connnission to arbitrate 
19 
this dispute. The Carthaginians refused to agree in advance to abide 
by any Roman decision. Cato left Africa without a settlement, but was 
impressed by the Carthaginians' show of resistance and their post-war 
prosperity. 20 In the winter of 151-150, a Carthaginian army invaded 
Numidia; Carthage had violated the treaty and had now only to await 
21 
its destruction. 
Cato had returned to Rome preaching of the dangers of the newly 
22 
emerging Carthage. Masinissa had provoked this war with Carthage 
in the hope that the Romans, who feared a rearmed Carthage, would 
award its territory to him. Instead Masinissa provided the stimulus 
which prodded Rome into a policy vowing the total destruction of 
23 Carthage. After its fall in 146, Masinissa did not inherit all of 
the old Carthaginian territory; Rome established a province from the 
area around Carthage in order to assure that no challenge to its au-
24 
thority would ever emerge from the area again. The heirs of Masi-
nissa were allowed to retain the Carthaginian territory he had taken 
before.146. With this they also inherited the responsibility of 
guarding the frontiers of their new territory from the incursions of 
interior tribesmen; Masinissa 1 s heirs became Rome's most important 
25 
client-princes. 
Although the Numidians did not take all of the Carthaginian 
51 
territory, they were the inheritors of the Carthaginian culture. The 
Romans gave the Numidians the contents of the Carthaginian library, 
Punic continued to be the official language of North Africa, and many 
of the survivors of the destroyed Carthaginian cities were welcomed 
into Numidia. 26 
Masinissa, however, did not live to see the final outcome of his 
aggression a_gainst Carthage. ·In 148 Scipio Aemilianus visited his 
court to ask for military aid against Carthage. Masinissa was close 
to death and instructed his three legitimate sons to accept Scipio's 
decision concerning the succession to his throne; Scipio's inter-
cession was logical since he had inherited the clientship of Masinissa 
from Scipio Africanus. 27 Scipio chose to make all three of Masinissa'a 
sons a king. He divided their duties so that Micipsa, the eldest, 
ruled the capital, Cirta, Mastanabal oversaw judicial affairs, and 
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the army was led by Gulussa. 28 After the death of his brothers, 
Micipsa became the sole king, and it was the quarrel over the success-
ion to his throne which began the civil war in Numidia. 
Sallust wrote the Bellum Iugurthinum to illuminate the origins 
of the civil wars which would eventually collapse the Republic. 29 
His work is not devoid of chronological and historical errors, but 
rather than intersperse criticisms and interpretations through a 
summary of Sallust's narrative, comments will be presented afterwards. 
This summary of Sallust's Bellum Iugurthinum will begin with 
Micipsa's sole reign in Numidia. Micipsa had two sons, Adherbal 
and Hiempsal, but he allowed his nephew, Jugurtha, the illegetimate 
son of Mastanabal, to reside in the royal palace. Jugurtha was older 
than either of Micipsa's sons, and soon attracted many followers 
through his winning personality and physical prowess. Micipsa, 
fearing that Jugurtha would usurp his kingdom upon his death, do-
nated cavalry which would be led by Jugurtha to the Numantine campaign 
of Scipio Aemilianus. Micipsa hoped that Jugurtha would die in the 
campaign; however, the young Numidian excelled in warfare and won 
the friendship of many Romans. While in Spain, some unscrupulous 
Romans encouraged Jugurtha to become the king of Numidia and assured 
him that he could purchase Roman approval of this action; Scipio, 
however, also befriended Jugurtha and warned him against bribing 
individual Roman citizens; he enjoined Jugurtha to cultivate Roman 
support by proving himself to be the friend of all the Roman people. 
Jugurtha returned to Numidia with a letter from Scipio;commending 
him to Micipsa. In response Micipsa adopted Jugurtha at once, thus 
30 
making him an equal heir with his own two young sons. 
53 
Upon Micipsa's death the princes met to decide how Numidia would 
be governed by them •. Hiempsal, the youngest of the three, taunted 
Jugurtha--an action which he would regret, for Jugurtha became deter-
mined to become the sole ruler of Numidia. Jugurtha instigated the 
murder of Hiempsal; in response, Adherbal sent envoys to Rome to report 
his brother's murder and began to raise a force to meet Jugurtha. 
Although outnumbered, Jugurtha's superiorly trained.soldiers defeated 
Adherbal's army. The vanquished prince then fled to Rome's African 
province and from there to Rome. Jugurtha solidified his domination 
of all Numidia and dispatched envoys to Rome with gold and silver to 
bribe a favorable decision from the Senate. Adherbal addressed the 
Senate with entreaties to place Rome's friend and ally back on his 
throne;: the envoys of Jugurtha, however, disclaimed any responsibility 
for the death of Hiempsal and claimed that Adherbal had attacked 
Jugurtha unjustly. In the Senate's discuss~on, a large number of 
senators, influenced by Jugurtha's bribes, supported.Jugurtha, while 
others wished to aid Adherbal and punish Jugurtha for Hiempsal 1 s 
murder. M. Aemilius Scaurus was among the group favoring Adherbal, 
but his support stennned not from a desire for justice, but from fear 
that the p.otorious bribery by Jugurtha would arouse popular unrest. 
The group favoring Jugurtha dominated the Senate; there fore, a 
connnission of ten men, led by L. Opimius, was sent to Africa to divide 
Numidia between Jugurtha and Adherbal. Jugurtha and.his envoys succee-
ded in bribing Opimius and a majority of the commission. The division 
the connnission decided upon awarded the more populous and fertile 
western Numidia to Jugurtha and eastern Numidia to Adherba1. 31 
But Jugurtha was not satisfied with his portion of Numidia; 
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encouraged by the success of his bribes in Rome, Jugurtha was deter-
mined to again engage the militarily inferior Adherbal. Jugurtha in-
vaded Adherbal's territory taking prisoners and booty but quickly 
retreating to western Numidia to await Adherbal's retaliation; however, 
Adherbal was equally determined not to engage Jugurtha. Disappointed 
by his foe's pacifism, Jugurtha raised a large army and invaded Ad-
herbal's territory with the intention of wresting control of all 
Numidia. Adherbal prepared for battle, but also sent envoys to des-
cribe the situation to the Senate. Jugurtha won handily and encircled 
Adherbal in Cirta where his defense was aided by Roman civilians. 
The Senate dispatched three young men to Africa to cormnand that the 
fighting cease and to settle the disagreement by law. Jugurtha 
heard their message and replied that his attack on Adherbal was pro-
voked by a plot engineered by Adherbal to assassinate him. Jugurtha 
promised to send envoys to the Senate to explain his actions; the Rom-
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an envoys left Africa without speaking to Adherbal. 
When Rome's envoys left Africa, Jugurtha again laid siege to Cirta. 
Adherbal, realizing his precarious position, sent two envoys to Rome 
with a letter revealing Jugurtha's disobedience of the Senate's wishes. 
Some senators favored sending an army to Africa to aid Adherbal, but 
the desires of this group were offset by those partisans of Jugurtha 
who represented his interests. Ultimately the Senate decided to sent 
another commission, comprised of important men, including the princeps 
senatus, M. Aemilius Scaurus. Jugurtha feared the decision of these 
powerful men and made a determined effort to take Cirta before meeting 
with them. However, Cirta did not succumb to him nor did he to the 
threats of the commission, which departed for Rome without concluding 
55 
the warfare. When the conunission could not compel Jugurtha to give 
up the siege of Cirta, the Italici, the primary defenders of the city, 
convinced Adherbal to surrender in return for a prbmise to guarantee 
! 
his life; the Italici reasoned that they would be spared on account 
of Rome's prestige. Jugurtha accepted Adherbal's surrender but 
ignored his promise. Adherba 1 was tortured and murdered; a 11 adult 
33 
Numidians and all traders carrying weapons were likewise slain. 
Jugurtha's massacre of the Italici once more brought the question 
of a Numidian war before the Senate. Jugurtha's friends attempted to 
prevent any senatorial action, but the harangue of the tribune-elect, 
G. Memmius, enlightened the Roman populace to the unscrupulous motives 
of some of the nobles. The Senate, prodded by fear of the populace, 
declared that Numidia be assigned to one of the consuls for the next 
year. L. Calpurnius Bestia was the consul who led the first military 
expedition against Jugrutha. 34 
Sallust's narrative of the events preceding Rome's declaration 
of war has been challenged by historians. Sallust characterized 
Jugurtha as a noble young man until he was introduced to avarice by 
the Roman nobles. 35 Such a characterization was utilitarian to 
Sallust, who continually scolded the Romans for their declining 
36 
virtues. Sallust reinforced the impression of Jugurtha's corruption 
by the Roman youths through his narrative which depicted the time in-
terval between Jugurtha's return from Spain and the war for Micipsa's 
throne as a few years; actually the intervening time was fifteen years. 
It is, therefore, unlikely that a conversation concerning Jugurtha's 
kingly potential fifteen years before Micipsa's death could have dras-
37 
tically affected Jugurtha 1 s actions against his sons. 
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Sallust's portrayal of Jugurtha's extensive bribery of Roman 
noblemen has likewise received scrutiny. The royal family of Numidia 
was in a client-patron relationship with the family of Scipio African-
us. Jugurtha was especially indebted to Scipio Aemilianus, for it 
was his reconunendation which won a share in the royal inheritance of 
Micipsa for him. With this information the nature of Jugurtha 1 s gifts 
to Romans becomes complicated; the gifts could represent bribes or 
h 1 ib d. f . l" k" 38 11 d 1 t e norma tr ute expecte o c 1ent- 1ngs. Sa ust an F orus 
insist that Jugurtha bribed favorable decisions from the Senate; 
Ernst Badian, however, is not so convinced of the nobility's lack of 
virtus. 39 Badian does not preceive any correlation between Jugurtha's 
40 gifts and the Senate's decisions. Gifts from clients were accepted 
as part of. the ancient~ maiorium; however, gifts to senators could 
41 
be portrayed as bribes by the political opposition. 
It would be too generous to depict the nobility as completely 
guiltless in accepting Jugurtha's gifts, but Sallust is guilty of 
42 
overemphasizing the greed of the senators. The reluctance on the 
part of many senators to punish Jugurtha may have stemmed from Jugur-
tha's patrons, the Scipiones. The Scipionic family created the Numi-
dian throne for Masinissa and his descendants. Although their power 
was ebbing, they could still influence many senators into a favorable 
position toward Jugurtha; in addition, Jugurtha had proven himself to 
be a loyal client to Rome and especially to the Scipionic family at 
43 
Numantia. Jugurtha's outstanding service to the Roman state in 
Spain doubtlessly won him many Roman friends; such comrades would now 
be influential middle-aged men. 44 The simplicity of Sallust 1 s inter-
pretation of the Senate's reluctance to oust Jugurtha from Numidia 
57 
is exposed further by an examination of the Senate's lega 1 responsibi-
lity to intervene in Numidian affairs. 
Rome was not legally bound to intervene in the affairs of a 
client-state; the basic relationship between Rome and its client-
states was friendship. 45 Although client-kings whose titles were 
recognized by the Senate were called ~' amicus or socius atgue 
amicus, there were no offensive or defensive commitments to these 
kings. When a king accepted the title of friendship with the Roman 
state, he was acknowledging his inferiority. While there was no 
obligation to aid client-kings, clients were expected to aid Rome. 
When Rome assumed the responsibility of designating the successor to 
a client-king's throne, as it did in Numidia, it also became the 
sole course of arbitration if a squabble over the throne began. In 
many cases disputes among heirs were settled by dividing the kingdom, 
but it was Rome's prerogative to enforce its decision or let the 
fighting continue. The key to intervention was the extent to which 
a civil war in a client-state threatened Rome's interests. It did 
not intervene in its client's affairs to enforce justice, but rather 
46 
to protect its own interests. 
Without an obligation to intervene, the Senate was free to choose 
the course which best reflected Rome's interests. It was reluctant 
to become embroiled in a civil war in Numidia, and followed its 
traditional means of diplomacy with client-states. 47 The Senate hoped 
to use its authority to end the Numidian war; the chief symbol of 
that assembly's authority was the princeps senatus, M. Aemilius 
Scaurus, who led one of the commissions to Numidia. Such diplomatic 
maneuvers usually were effective with client-states and, from Numidia's 
history of fierce loyalty to Rome, it could be expected that the 
48 
Numidian kings would readily accept the Senate's mandates. When 
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the fighting did not end, the senators were vulnerable to the opposi-
tion's charges that they had been bribed. The oligarchs were, in fact, 
honestly trying to avoid a war in Numidia, and attempted through the 
use of commissions to reach a peaceful settlement. 49 
The Senate followed the established procedure of declaring war 
in its diplomacy with Jugurtha. Much of its apparent hesitation to 
take swift action against Jugurtha was due to Rome's system of de-
claring war, the ius fetiale. Before the state committed itself to 
war the procedure of the fetial law was observed; there were five 
steps in this procedure. The first step was ~ repetuntur, a demand 
for satisfaction, then bellum denuntiatur, a statement that the other 
party had not satisfied the grievance. The next step was senatus 
censet, the Senate's vote for war, then the comitia voted for war, 
populus iubet. The final step was bellum indicitur, throwing aspear 
into the enemy's territory, which was the traditional declaration of 
war. By the Second Punic War the fetial process changed; the Senate 
took a dominant role in the procedure. The basic steps remained the 
same, however the order in which they occurred was jumbled. The new 
process was senatus censet, populus iubet, ~ repetuntur, bellum 
denuntiatur, and bellum indicitur. The procedural changes meant that 
the comi tia voted for war before the demand for sat is faction was 
presented. Therefore if the Roman demands were rejected, the senator-
ial legati could declare war right away. In effect, the legati left 
Rome with a conditional declaration of war; this increased the Senate's 
50 
control of foreign affairs. 
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In an effort to avoid a war, the Senate followed the fetial pro-
51 
cedure and sent three commissions to solve the Numidian problem. 
After the murder of Heimpsal, Adherbal fled to the Romans with the 
intention of securing their aid; Jugurtha's envoys also appeared and 
presented his interpretation of the events. The Senate could either 
divide the territory between the claimants or commit forces to Nuinidia 
to determine which was the aggressor. The senators chose to divide 
Numidia, and sent a commission of ten legati, led by L. Opimius, to 
divide the kingdom; such a settlement suited Rome's interests. Peace 
in the country neighboring its African province waR to Rome's advan-
tage, as also was the preservation of a king of proven loyalty as the 
52 king of Numidia. 
After four years of peace, Jugurtha surrounded Adherbal in Cirta; 
again Adherbal's plead for assistance resulted in another Roman 
commission. Three young men comprised the second commission. Al-
though Sallust derided the dispatching of adulescentes, this was a 
regular procedure. 53 The thr.ee lega ti interviewed Jugurtha and pre-
sented the Roman demands to him; Jugtirtha replied that it would be 
an injustice for him to comply with their demands and promised to 
send envoys to Rome to present his case. The commission left Africa 
without speaking to Adherbal and without ending the conflict. After 
their departure Jugurtha redoubled his efforts to take Cirta before 
the envoys brought the result of their mission to Rome. 54 
With the news of the envoys' failure, some senators clamored to ~ 
send aid to Adherbal, but the majority agreed to make one final peace 
effort. The Senate dispatched a third commission; distinguished men, 
including the princeps senatus, comprised this commission. Hoping to 
60 
take Cirta, Jugurtha hesitated as long as possible before meeting with 
these men. Although the commission was firm, they also returned to 
Rome with the grievances unsatisfied. 55 
The action of the Senate followed the new fetial procedure; it 
decided upon war and the comitia voted for a conditional declaration 
of war, senatus censet and popolus iubet. The Senate could now use the 
threat of war for leverage in its negotiation with Jugurtha. The 
three young legates delivered the rerum repetito or demand of satis-
faction of grievances. Young envoys were chosen so that if they were 
rejected, the Senate would not be as greatly insulted as it would have 
been if the commission had contained distinguished men; the oligarchs 
were still attempting to avoid a war. The connnission met with Jugur-
tha and delivered an ultimatum; the crafty Numidian, however, claimed 
that he was the injured party and would sent envoys to Rome. Possi-
bly Jugurtha agreed to stop fighting until his envoys were heard; 
this would have prevented the bellum denuntiatur, or statement that 
Rome's demands had been rejected, from being delivered. Jugurtha 
waited until the embassy left Africa before renewing his attacks upon 
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Cirta. 
After the young envoys' return, the Senate again received a 
desperate appeal from Adherbal. A debate began in the Senate to 
decide if aid should be sent to him; the rationale for such action was 
that Jugurtha had disobeyed the legati. This confiTms that Jugurtha 
had made some concessions to the envoys, which he was now disregarding. 
The Senate agreed to a final connnission comprised of distinguished men; 
they were assigned to either stop the fighting or deliver the bellum 
denuntiatur. This connnission also departed for Rome without Jugurtha's 
61 
compliance with its demands. The Senate had to make the final decision; 
it had attempted to avoid a Numidian war, but now it had to decide 
whether to ignore Jugurtha's disobedience of the bellum denuntiatur 
. . f 57 or conunit its orces to war. 
Sallust .manipulated the Senate's reluctance to begin a war against 
J th i .d f . d 'b·1· 58 I ugur a nto evi ence o incompetence an corrupti i ity. n 
reality the oligarchic assembly had ample justification to delay the 
war or to ignore Jugurtha entirely. At the same time Jugurtha was 
fighting in Africa, the Senate was conscious of threatening maneuvers 
displayed by the Cimbri in Gaul. The problems involved in directing 
wars in Gaul and Africa at the same time would have tempered its 
desire to punish Jugurtha's disobedience. 59 
Jugurtha's character also probably influenced the Senate's hesi-
tance; as a loyal client of the Scipiones, he would have the support 
of many influential men, especially those with whom he had served in 
60 
the Numantine campaign of Scipio Aemilianus. The Senate could ex-
pect obedience from its client-princes, espeeially from one of proven 
loyalty, and, irt fact, may have wished to keep Jugurtha on the Numidian 
throne. Jugurtha was a militarily powerful king and therefore would 
be able to defend the frontiers of Rome's province in Africa. Further-
more if a war was begun in Africa, the Roman army would have to develop 
61 
tactics for desert fighting. In spite of these objections the Senate 
was compelled to begin a war it did not want and had tried to avoid. 
After the news of the Cirta massacre reached Rome, G. Menunius, 
tribune-elect, aroused the anger of the people by exclaiming that the 
nobles were stalling in their deliberations and intended to do nothing 
about Jugurtha. The Senate was pressured by the anger of the people 
62 
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to declare war. This is Sallust's interpretation of the origin of 
that body's declaration of war. The murder of the Italian traders un-
doubtedly outraged Romans, but it was not the legal reason that the 
Senate declared war. The technical reason was that Jugurtha had 
disobeyed its commands and killed Adherbal, the amicus and socius of 
Rome. Jugurtha had defied the denuntiatio of the Senate, and for 
this reason that assembly declared waz-. 63 The Senate, however, was 
under no obligation to declare war, it could have ignored the actions 
of Jugurtha. However, the pressure from Memmius forced the Senate 
into its decision. It was ultimately the actions of Roman Politicians 
which l;>egan the Jugurthine War. 
The influence of factionalism upon the Senate's decision cannot 
be discounted. The year that Bestia was to be sent against Jugurtha 
was 111; this is the same year that the Metellan factio established 
its dominance. Jugurtha was the traditiona 1 client of the Scipiones, 
and as their power eclipsed so perhaps did the influence they could 
64 
command in his interests. But more importantly the outrage over 
the murder of the Italians in Cir ta created a poli ti ca 1 base for a 
65 
new popular party. Sallust describes Menunius as an opponent of 
senatorial domination; Memmius enlightened the plebs and the equites 
to tra nobles' corruptibility. In his opinion they had declined to the 
point of sacrificing the state's interests in favor of their own 
66 
greed. The charges that the Senate had been bribed to protect 
Jugurtha forged a coalition between the plebs and the equites, the 
old power based used by the Gracchi. This power base was probably 
manipulated by a faction led by nobles which used the tribune Memmius 
67 
as their spokesman. 
63 
It is easy to determine the plebs' motivation in clarmoring for 
a war against Jugurtha; however, the factors influencing the equites 
are not so easily ascertained. The plebs were disenchanted with the 
government and readily absorbed propaganda which branded the senators 
with political vice. To the plebs, Roman honor had been insulted by 
68 
Jugurtha and they chose the Roman army to restore it. 
The influence of the equites was more important than that of 
the plebs, and their support for a Numidian war, contrary to the wishes 
of the Senate, is significant. There is a possibility that equestrian 
support arose from a purely economic motivation. The arguments suppor-
ting such an economic motivation rest upon the traditional role of 
the equites as Roman businessmen. As businessmen, they would be 
displeased if their trading territory was reduced by the Cirta 
massacres; they would have then supported a war to re-establish a 
peaceful trading territory. If such a retaliatory war was declared, 
the equites could expect to profit from the supply contracts that 
69 
would be awarded. Superficially the case for economic motivation 
appears sound, but the nature of foreign trade conducted by Italians, 
and the Senate's obligation to these traders deserves more scrutiny. 
During the reign of Micipsa, the Roman Senate did not direct 
the development of its African province. The province had not been 
acquired in order to develop its potential, but to preclude any 
resurgence of an alien power. However, without senatorial direction, 
Romans and Italians did immigrate to Africa; most of these were 
70 
negotiatores or traders. The negotiatores trafficked in merchandise 
71 
and functioned as bankers. These negotiatores were, for the most 
part, Italians and not equites or even Roman citizens; they usually 
64 
operated as individuals and were not members of powerful organiza-
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tions. They were in Carthaginian territory even before 146 and 
therefore were present to fill the trading void created by the destruc-
tion of Carthage. The negotiatores based their operations in Utica and 
Hadrumetum, but they quickly expanded into Numidia, especially into 
73 Vega and Cirta. It is difficult to assess the Senate's responsibi-
lity for the safety of Italians in foreign countries. Generally, 
74 
the senate was considered the patron of its Italian allies. The 
protection of !ta lian traders may have been part of the Numidian 
treaty of friendship, as it was with other nations, but this cannot 
75 be determined. However, the Senate was not noted for being respon-
. h d i f h d" 1 76 sive to t e es res o t e tra ing c ass. 
There was no demand for annexation by either the equites or the 
plebs at the conclusion of the war; a territory did not have to be a 
province for the equites to make profits, as was evidenced by the 
presence of Italians in Numidia before the war. In addition a war 
would only interrupt normal trade; it therefore appears unlikely that 
the equites demanded a war in Numidia so they could increase their 
d . . 77 f tra ing territory. Concerning equestrian pro its from war contracts, 
the real profiteers of any Roman war were individual senators. 78 
Therefore, the equites opposed the Senate and demanded war, like the 
plebs, to restore Rome's honor which had been insulted at Cirta. 
Undoubtedly the equites desired vengenance for the deaths of the 
Italian traders, some of whom may have been connected with Roman 
79 trading concerns. The equites and the plebs formed a powerful bloc 
in opposition to the Senate--a coalition which was cemented by its 
direction of the war. Unbalanced by the defection of the equites, 
the Senate faced a war which, as Sallust correctly evaluated, would 
ultimately result in a Roman civil war. 80 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE JUGURTHINE WAR 
The Roman Senate dispatched the consul Bestia in 111 to restore 
Rome's honor by defeating jugurtha. Sallust's text is the most com-
prehensive ancient source concerning the events of the Jugurthine 
War, and for clarity, a.synopsis of the events in Sallust's text will 
be presented before connnentaries and interpretation of those events. 
The latter begins his narrative of the war with the consulship of 
Bestia. 
Upon learning that the Senate had declared war, Jugurtha sent an 
embassy to Rome to bribe the Senate into inactivity. That assembly, 
however, refused to even admit his envoys into the city unless they 
had come to sur~ender Numidia and its king to Rome; his envoys there-
fore left Italy as the consul prepared an army. Bestia had uiany fine 
qualities; however, his virutes were overshadowed by his obsessive 
greed. Bestia chose nobles, including Scaurus, as his lieutenants; 
these men were loyal partisans who would aid his unscrupulous behavior. 
When his army landed in Africa, Bestia took the in:i:tia tive and sacked 
1 
several Numidian towns. 
Bestia's avarice led him to accept bribes and advice from 
Jugurtha's envoys; these envoys warned the Roman commander of the over-
whelming difficulties of a prolonged war in Numidia. Scaurus, who 
had opposed Jugurtha previously, was now bribed into compliance with 
Bestia. Jugurtha succeeded in winning a delay in hostilities; he 
hoped to use this time to appeal to the Senate. However, having 
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learned of the presence of Scaurus, the Numidian king decided to 
meet directly with the Roman commanders in Africa. Jugurtha appeared 
before the council of war and asked to surrender himself; he pledged 
also to surrender thirty elephants and some cattle and horses, and 
pay a small sum of money. He met separately with Bestia and Scaurus 
to make a private agreement. With the hostilities concluded, Bestia 
2 
returned to Rome to preside over the elections. 
Romans were far from jubilant when Bestia's scandalous agreement 
with Jugurtha became known. The senators were as outraged as the 
plebs; the senators, however, feared the vengeance of Scaurus if they 
rejected the treaty which he and Bestia had arranged. The dilemma of 
the Senate was inflamed by the harangues of the tribune Memmius. 
Again Menunius chided the arrogant and cruel nobles to the delight of 
the plebs. The tribu~e upbraided the insolent, domineering senatorial 
order in a speech before the plebs and demanded that Jugurtha be 
brought to Rome to reveal the names of those whom he had bribed; 
3 
those traitors to Rome could then be punished by the courts. 
Menunius succeeded in convincing the plebs to dispatch Lucius 
Cassius to Africa to bring Jugurtha to Rome for interrogation. The 
plebs also agreed to promise the Numidian king safe-conduct while he 
was in Rome. The discipline of Bestia 1 s army began to disintegrate in 
his absence; his officers entered into various agreements which re-
turned Jugurtha 1 s elephants and deserters to him. Cas.sius convinced 
Jugurtha to return with him to Rome by offering the Numidian his 
personal guarantee for his safety. Upon his arrival at Rome, Jugurtha 
won, through a bribe, the collusion of the tribune Gaius Baebius. 
Menunius addressed Jugurtha before the assembly of the plebs and ordered 
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him to reveal the names of those whom he had bribed, for his reticence 
would save neither himself nor his accomplices. However, before Ju-
gurtha could answer these charges, Baebius commanded him to keep 
4 
silent; stalemated, Menunius learned nothing from the Numidian. 
Before Jugurtha departed Rome, he ordered his assistant, Bomilcar, 
to arrange the assassination of a Numidian, Massiva, who was also a 
grandson of Masinissa, but had not favored Jugurtha in the Numidian 
civil war. Spurius Albinus, the consul who was to succeed Bestia, 
was sponsoring Massiva for the Numidian throne; Albinus, eager for 
the glory of war, wished to prolong the Numidian conflict by further 
confusing matters. Bomilcar hired assassins who accomplished the mur-. 
der; however, one assassin was captured. l With the c 1Jnfession of the 
apprehended assassin, Bomilcar was arrested for the murder of Massiva. 
Jugurtha guaranteed the bond for his assistant with fifty of his 
friends, but, upon his release, sent Bomilcar back to Numidia. The 
murder of Massiva diminished the number of Jugurtha's Roman friends 
and convinced the Senate to renew the war; that body then ordered 
Jugurtha to leave Italy. 5 Upon leaving Rome, Jugurtha was reported 
to have said, "• •• 'A city for sale and doomed to speedy destruction 
if it finds a purchaser~ 1116 
Albinus hastened to Africa and began vigorous attacks with the 
hope of securing an end to the war before the next elections. Just 
as Albinus pushed for a speedy victory, Jugurtha prolonged the war 
by beginning false surrender negotiations and then breaking them off. 
Without a conclusion to the conflict, Albinus departed for Rome to 
7 preside over the elections and left his brot;her, Aulus, in command. 
The elections in Rome were delayed for a year because of an 
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attempt by two tribunes, P. Lucullus and L. Annius, to pro long their 
terms. In this interim, Aulus became determined to bring an end to 
the war or, at least, to receive some bribes from Jugurtha. Aulus 
led a mid-winter attack upon a stronghold of the Numidian king. In-
duced by Jugurtha's feign of submission, Aulus agreed to meet with him 
in a remote region. The cunning Numidian had meanwhile successfully 
bribed Roman centurions and cavalry commanders to aid him in a sur-
prise attack upon the Roman camp. The Numidians attacked at night, 
gained admission to the camp, and completely subdued the Romans. 
Jugurtha offered Aulus disgraceful terms--either the Roman army would 
pass under the yoke and Aulus would agree to leave Numidia within ten 
days or all would perish. Aulus accepted his terms and withdrew to 
8 
the Roman province. 
The actions ·of Aulus disgraced the Roman people, and Albinus 
hurriedly assembled a new army and prepared to return to Africa. 
The Senate, of course, rejected the terms of the treaty between Jugur-
tha and Aulus, for no treaty was binding upon the Roman people until 
the Senate accepted it. Albinus returned to Africa, but the tribunes 
had prevented him from taking his newly levied army with him. Once 
in Africa, he found the army so demoralized that it was impossible to 
avenge his brother's disgrace, and_he simply awaited the actions of the 
9 
Senate and the oeople of Rome. 
The narrative of Sallust shows how the Senate bungled the direc-
tion of a minor war so that it became a major threat to its dominance. 
The Jugurthine War was born of factional animosity and, as it continued, 
increased the campaign material of the populares. The first two sena-. 
torial commanders were cautious in pursuing the elusive Numidian. 
75 
Their failure resulted in renewed charges of incompetence and corrup-
10 
tion against the nobles. 
Sallust attributed the treaty concluded by Bestia to his avarice; 
however, closer examination of his conduct purges the consul of bla-
tant greed. Bestia chose to enter into negotiations with Jugurtha 
after only a few victories over the Numidians. Such swiftness in 
negotiations could have been the result of confidential orders from 
the Senate. The nobles did not favor a Numidian war and could well 
have instruct:e.d Bestia to conclude a peace treaty as quickly as 
possible. Such a theory could explain the presence of Scaurus among 
the legati; the influence of the princeps sena tus would support such 
11 
a treaty against the accusations of the political opposition. A 
speedy conclusion to the Jugurthine War would have pleased the Senate, 
which followed a policy of avoiding wars, and possibly the equites, 
whose trading territory in Numidia would again be peaceful. However, 
Bestia's treaty became political fodder for Memmius, who accused 
Bestia and Scaurus of accepting bribes to grant such easy terms to a 
12 
murderer. 
Livy described the treaty which Bestia concluded as unauthorized 
by the Senate. However, a Roman general was free to accept the 
surrender of a foe and his nation, or deditio, at any time without the 
consent of Rome. Bestia probably agreed to allow Jugurtha to remain 
the king of Numidia, but such an agreement could be accepted or 
rejected by the Senate, which had the ultimat.e decision on treaties. 
Bestia and Scaurus were, from all appearances, within their rights 
to conclude a treaty with Jugurtha. Yet Memmius accused them of 
betraying their country and prostituting the dignity of the Senate 
and commanded that Jugurtha be brought to Rome for questioning. 13 
Bestia was probably guilty of accepting bribes for the advice or 
promises he gave Jugurtha; however, the practice of accepting bribes 
14 
from a conquered foe was customary among the Roman aristocracy. 
The bribery of Scaurus, however, was an invention of the prejudicial 
15 
Sallust. 
Gaius Memmius personified the popular party in Sallust's narra-
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tive. Information on the origins of Menunius' disgust for the nobility 
is very scant. There was a Menunius who as military tribune in 
Numantia was upbraided by Scipio Aemilianus; this could have been the 
G. Memmius who was tribune in 111 or was certainly a relative of his. 16 
In the speech Sallust quotes, Memmius is extrememly derogatory.in his 
criticisms of the nobility. This speech was undoubtedly embellished 
17 
to allow Sallust to vent his own hostilities upon the nobles. 
Whether or not the speech reflected Menunius perfectly, he did 
arouse the plebs to strike out at the nobles. Accusing Bestia and 
Scaurus of bribery, Memmius convinced the plebs to demand the appear-
ance of Jugurtha in order that he might be questioned. Under a pledge 
of protection, praetor L. Cassius Longinus delivered Jugurtha before 
the plebs for interrogation. However, before he could be questioned, 
the intercessio of tribune G. Baebius silenced all inquisitors. Appar-
ently the purpose of the interrogation was to obtain necessary evid-
18 
ence before Menunius made formal accusations. Thwarted, the tribune 
was forced to abandon his accusations; obviously the charges against 
19 
Bestia and Scaurus were unfounded and of political origin. 
Jugurtha turned his visit to Rome into an opportunity to arrange 
the murder of a rival to his throne. His cousin Massiva was murdered 
77 
by assassins hired by his aide, Bomilcar. Although this action out-
raged the Romans, the pledge of safe-conduct was upheld and Jugurtha 
. 20 
returned to Numidia. He was extremely shortstghted in ordering 
the demise of M'assiva. The Senate could not possibly accept Bestia's 
21 
treaty after the murder, and the war began again. 
Sp. Postumius Albinus was the consul for 110 to whom Numidia 
was designated. Unable to end the war through either military or 
diplomatic maneuvers, Albinus left his brother, Aulus, in conunand 
while he returned to Rome. Aulus led a disastrous offensive against 
Jugurtha which resulted in the humiliation of the Roman army. Al-
binus returned to Africa, but was inactive and awaited his replace-
ment. Tbs Senate rejected the treaty Jugurtha had compelled Aulus 
to accept. The African had sealed his doom when he humiliated Roman 
legions, for now the Senate became truly connnitted t~J a war in which 
the only prize was Jugurtha; the war would be pressed until he was 
22 
either captured or dead. The disgrace of Aulus was ideal propa-
ganda material for the popular party, and this group initiated an 
investigation into the Senate's conduct of the war. 
According to Sallust, as Albinus waited in Africa, factiona 1 
politics in Rome resulted in a major investigation of the nobles 
who had negotiated with Jugurtha. The purpose of this special court 
was to determine which individuals had advised Jugurtha to disobey 
the Senate, which envoys and commanders had accepted money from him, 
which military personnel had returned elephants and deserters to the 
Numidian, and to investigate all who had made terms of peace or war 
with the king. Gaius M'amilius Limetanus proposed a plebiscite to 
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establish this special investigation; its passage was opposed by 
those who feared its judgment and the factional battle which it would 
23 
undoubtedly create. 
The plebs, however, relished the idea of a special court to 
investigate the nobles and joyfully passed the proposal of Mamilius 
into law. Political confusion and agitation resulted; nevertheless, 
Scaurus, who had been one of Bestia 1 s legates, arranged to be named 
one of the guaesitores, or investigators, for the new commission. 
In Sallust's estimation the judgment of the commission was harsh and 
founded· upon hearsay evidence and the whim of the plebs. 24 Unfortuna-
tely Sallust does not elaborate upon what the Mamilian Commission con-
eluded. 
Cicero provides the names of those convicted by the guaestio 
extraordinaria of 109 established at the request of Mamilius. Four 
men of consular rank and one priest were exiled and suffered the loss 
of their civil rights; they were Lucius Bestia, Gaius Cato, Spurius 
Albinus, Lucius Opimius, and Gaius Galba. 25 Obviously three of the 
convicted--Opimius, Bestia, and Albinus--were involved either in the 
diplomacy before or the conduct of the Jugurthine War. Opimius had 
led a commission to divide Numidia between Adherba 1 and Jugurtha, 
Bestia was the first Roman commander to engage Jugurtha, and Albinus 
was the most recen~ commander. Both the commands of Bestia and Al-
binus resulted in treaties which the Senate would not approve. Cato 
and Galba, however, had no apparent relationship to the Jugurthine 
War and the rationale for their convictions is a mystery until their 
earlier careers are examined. 
G. Porcius Cato was a follower of Tiberius Gracchus early in his 
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career; his first political colleagues were apparently G. Carbo and 
G. Gracchus. After the Gracchi, Cato switched his allegiance to 
other politica 1 forces. In 114 he was a consul and led a campaign in 
'fllrace against the Scordisci. Cato's campaign was a disaster, and 
when he returned to Rome in 113, he was condemned on charges of de 
repetundis and fined a small amount. There is no evidence that Cato 
ever participated in one of the African commissions dealing with the 
Numidian problem. 'flle closest connection to Numidian affairs for G. 
Porcius Cato was that his brother, M. Porcius Cato, died on a mission 
26 
to Africa. The reason for Cato's conviction by the Mamilian 
Commission is intertwined with the careers of Galba, Opimius, and 
Bestia. 
'flle conviction of G. Sulpicius Galba, a priest, is also apparent-
ly in contradiction to the aim of the Mamilian Commission. Galba's 
early career, like Cato's, began in the Gracchan fac.tion. Galba 
married Licinia, the younger daughter of P. Licinius Crassus Dives 
Mucianus, a member of the faction led by T. Gracchus. 'flle younger 
brother of Tiberius also married a daughter of P. Crassus; therefore, 
Galba was the brother-in-law of G. Gracchus. Using his marriage as 
evidence of his political affiliation, Galba was probably part of the 
27 faction of the Gracchi. 
After the death of G. Gracchus, the land commission established 
by the Gracchi was dominated by the anti-Gracchan faction. 'flle three 
new commissioners were G. Sulpicius Galba, G. Papirius Carbo, and L. 
. 28 Calpurnius Bestia; Galba had defected from the Gracchan faction. 
The common factor in the careers of Cato and Galba was their defection 
from the Gracchi 1 s factio, and this was the reason they were convicted 
80 
by the Mamilian Commission. While Opimius and Bestia had a direct 
relationship with Numidian affairs, they also had earned the animosity 
of the Gracchan faction earlier in their careers. 
Lucius Opimius was convicted by the Mamilian Commission on 
charges related to the mission he conducted which divided Numidia 
between Adherbal and Jugurtha. The actual reason he was convicted 
was the unpleasant memory he evoked from the former followers of the 
Gracchi. In 121 Opimius, as consul, destroyed thousands of that 
factio 1 s members; their desire for revenge was inflamed by his acquit-
tal in 120 of illegally slaying G. Gracchus' followers. Opimius 
suffered from their haunting revenge in 109; undoubtedly the charges 
against him originated from his politics and· not his diplomacy; 
for at the time his commission divided Numidia, there were no protests 
29 
or charges of corruption. 
Of the five men convicted the only ones who drew the suspicion 
and outrage of the plebs over their conduct of Numidian affairs were 
L. Ca lpurnius Bestia and Sp. Postumius Albinus. The command of Al-
binus was a disaster and his conviction was assured; however, 
although there was much discussion concerning his honesty, no proof 
f B • I , 1 d 30 o est1a s corruption was ever revea e • Bestia 1 s conviction, like 
that of Cato, Galba, and Opimius, was founded not upon his diplomacy 
with Jugurtha, but the action he took against the Gracchi. As tri-
bune in 120, Bestia recalled from exile P. Popillius Laenas, consul of 
132, who had suppressed the factio of Tiberius Gracchus. Bestia also 
31 
served on the formerly Gracchan land commission with Galba and Carbo. 
Sallust chose not to discuss the results of tre Mamilian Commis-
sion; after he introduced the topic in his narrative, he began an 
81 
analysis of factional politics in Rome. This author described the 
political atmosphere in Rome as harmonious before the destruction of 
Carthage. However, with military security, a political and economic 
32 
chasm divided the nobles and the plebs. The nobles dominated the 
government; in Sallust's words, " ••• the treasury, the provinces, 
public offices, glory and triumphs" were reserved for the oligarchy 
33 
of the nobles. The plebs were exploited for military use, and their 
homes fell prey to the expanding latifundia. The Gracchi emerged from 
this political and economic turmoil to champion the plebs, and there-
fore bore the animosity of the oligarchs. Sallust abruptly ended his 
discus~ion of factional politics with the cruel suppression of the 
34 Gracchi's followers. He did not state that the Mamilian Commission 
was an act of revenge by the old Gracchan faction., but his discussion 
of the Gracchi implied a connection with the Mamilian guaestio. 
The Mamilian Conunission resulted not only from the revival of 
the old Gracchan party, but also from a new coalition of equites and 
plebs. The Gracchan policies brought the equites to political power, 
and once again, they, with the plebs, formed a power bloc opposing 
the nobles. 35 G. Gracchus' most powerful political gift to the equites 
was his judicial reform; the equestrian class was now the sole con-
tributor of jurymen. The Senate had used the special courts as its 
primary weapon to suppress tha Gracchan faction; however, with the 
Vestal Virgin case as a precedent, the equestrian jurors convicted the 
36 Gracchan faction's enemies tried before the Mamilian Conunission. 
The men who led the coalition of equites and plebs against the 
anti-Gracchans are, for the most part, unidentifiable. The primary 
instigators of the Mamilian guaestio identified by Sallust are Menunius 
82 
and Mamilius. As tribune, Memmius ordered the appearance of Jugurtha 
before the plebs and later served as a prosecutor for the quaestio; 
Mamilius was only a tribune when he called upon the concilium plebis 
bli h . 1 . . 37 to esta s a specia commission. Perhaps L. Cassius Longinus, 
the praetor Memmius sent to retrieve Jugurtha, was a member of this 
38 
group. No positive identification of other leaders has been made, 
and it was not until Marius exploited the coalition that its leader• 
39 
ship could be determined. 
The stated purpose of the _g_uaes tio established by Mamilius was 
to condemn those who had betrayed Rome's interests in negotiating with 
Jugurtha. The decision of the court, however, was the conviction of 
nobles who had opposed the Gracchi. Th s commission was part of a 
series of trials dating back to the trial of Carbo in 120 designed to 
eliminate the anti-Gracchans. The group supporting the Mamilian 
quaestio had no plans to end the Numidian war, nor was it even con-
cerned with it. To that faction, the inability of the Senate to end 
the Numidian hostilities was an opportunity to attack the nobles and 
enlist the aid of both the plebs and equites.40 This faction prose-
cuted the enemies of the people--not the Metellan factio--as is obvious 
through the investigation of the careers of those the guaestio con-
41 demned. 
Although the Mamilian Commission was the first threat to the 
Senate's control of the government since the Gracchi, it did not 
42 produce any major changes. The faction supporting the guaestio 
prosecuted indviduals and did not challenge that assembly's political 
dominance. Their main purpose was revenge; therefore, they had no 
43 
reforms planned for the state. After the immediate threat of the 
conunission subsided, normal factional strife resumed among the 
nobles. 44 · Although the Senate was secure in its position, it was 
once again reminded of the power wielded by a coalition of equites 
and plebs. No longer was the special court merely the battlegrotind 
83 
of the factions, but, as demonstrated by the guaestio, it was now the 
45 
weapon of the equites and plebs. 
Before continuing with the Senate's direction of the Jugurthine 
War, the role of M. Aemilius Scaurus in the Mamilian Conunission de-
serves discussion. In his narrative, Sallust depicted Scaurus as an 
unscrupulous politician; this view has been attacked by historians.46 
In a more unbiased view, Scaurus emerges as a skillful politican. He 
was of patrician ancestry and, through his marriage to Metella, had 
cemented a political alliance with the Metelli. As princeps senatus 
in 115 and censor in 109, he attained additional prestige. 47 During 
his career Scaurus was deeply involved in Numidian affairs; he con-
ducted a mission to Numidia and later served as a legate wi&h Bestia. 
Given his earlier career in Numidian negotiation, Scaurus' appearance 
as one of the guaesitores for the corrm1ission is, at first, surprising. 
Scaurus 1 role in the guaestio indicated his power and position in 
politics. The fact that he was not prosecuted by the conunission 
48 proved that Scaurus had not been a grave offender of the Gracchi. 
Scaurus' reputation for taking a harsh stand against Jugurtha, plus 
his prestigious career, would have made him an asset to the commis-
49 
sion. His position in the court.also showed his adaptability in 
politics; although a member of the Metellan factio, Scaurus had 
greater independence and flexibility than the Metelli. It was probably 
this independence which allowed him, a member of the aristocracy, 
. . h . . 50 to participate on t e commission. 
According to A. Hands, it was Scaurus' flexibility which earned 
him Sallust's literary disgust. To that moralistic historian, poli-
tical adaptability was equated with disloyalty; for this reason, he 
51 
84 
distrusted the abrupt political changes in Scaurus 1 career. Scaurus' 
successful political career deserved vindication of Sallust's bias. 
His innocence of the bribery charge was made apparent by the Mamilian 
52 Commission's non-prosecution. 
With the conclusion of the Mamilian Commission, the Senate 
resumed its governmental authority and chose Quinths Caecilius 
Metellus, consul for 109, to defeat the Numidian enemy. Metellus 
was a wise choice for the Senate; he was renowned as an efficient 
1 . bl 53 h genera and an incorrupti e man. As a member oft e dominant fac-
tion, Metellus enjoyed the support and encouragement of the Senate, 
and, because of his outstanding qualities, obtained the confidence 
54 
of the plebs. For his Numidian campaign, Metellus gathered rein-
forcements and chose experienced soldiers, C. Marius and P. Rutilius 
55 
Rufus, as his legates •. 
Before the war against Jugurtha could be renewed, the new Roman 
general had to retrain the army which he inherited from Albinus. As 
he trained his army, Metellus received envoys who brought entreaties 
of surrender from Jugurtha. Metellus, however, refused any negotia-
tions which allowed Jugurtha to remain a free man; the objective of 
56 
the Roman army was to secure the king's person. Metellus led his 
army into Numidia and was welcomed into its villages and cities. Ul-
timately Jugurtha realized the futility of his negotiations and pre-
85 
pared an ambush for the Roman army. In the ensuing battle, the 
Numidian's army was defeated, but Jugurtha escaped. Although his 
army was routed, Jugurtha was not vanquished and retreated into Numidia 
57 to raise a new army. 
Jugurtha's escape forced the Romans to change their strategy. 
Metellus began a campaign to destroy the king's sources of men and 
supplies by capturing and garrisoning Numidian towns~ As Metellus 
roamed Numidia destroying fields and taking towns, Jugurtha offered 
only a guerrilla-type resistance to the Romans. 58 While in winter 
quartera, Metellus encouraged Bomilcar, Jugurtha 's assistant, to con-
vince the king to surrender, but negotiations ended when Jugurtha 
was ordered to surrender himself. Although he had,not yet captured 
' 59 
the Numidian, the .senate extended Metellus' connnan:I for 108. 
Jugurtha, however, was not the only connnander in the Numidian 
war to suffer from dissension in his army. Metellus' legate, Caius 
Marius, began a campaign to usurp his superior's command. Marius 
was a novus homo in Roman politics; however, by the time of the Jugur-
thine War, he was well acquainted with the politics of the Mediterran-
ean capital. A member of an equestrian family in Arpinum, Marius 
began his military career as a member of Scipio Aemilianus' army in 
60 
Numantia. 
During this campaign Marius was elected military tribune, but 
his political career may have been temporarily halted by the death of 
Scipio in 129. It was customary for the great Roman families to bring 
promising equites into their factions as clients, and Marius may have 
been a client of Scipio. Eventually Marius became a member of the 
Metellan faction; however, during the interim between his political 
offices, Marius developed an association with the publicani. This 
alliance provided Marius with wealth and political support. In 123 
his elective career began again with the quaestorship. 61 
86 
In 119 his patrons, the Metelli, secured the tribunate for him. 
After the Gracchi, the oligarchs distrusted the revolutionary power 
of the tribunate; therefore, they attempted to have tribunes elected 
who would represent their interests. Apparently, Marius was to ful-
fill this role; however, his actions as a tribune alienated his new 
62 
supporters.· Marius introduced and secured passage of legislation 
designed.to diminish the oligarchs' influence over the voters in the 
comitia. According to his law, the pontes, or bridges, where the 
voters voted were narrowed. Formerly custodes tab~llarum, influen-
tial men chosen by the candidates, stood on the pontes distributing 
ballots to the voters; their purpose was to influ.ence the voters' 
63 
choice. The .Senate opposed the law and sunnnoned the tribune to 
explain why he had not consulted it about this law. Marius defended 
his law and threatened to arrest the consluls, L. Aurelius Cotta and 
Metellus Delmaticus, for their interference. When no tribune came 
to the consuls' aid, the Senate backed down. Although Marius had 
won a popular victory, he had lost the support of the Metelli. 64 
Marius 1 alienation of the Metelli apparently contradicts his 
political ambitions; however, 119 was a year of political reversals 
for the oligarchs. It was in that year that P. Decius Subulo, the 
prosecutor of L. Opimius, was acquitted by an equestrian jury, and 
that Carbo, the former supporter of the Gracchi who defended L. 
Opimius, was forced by the prosecution of L. Crassus to commit suicide. 
After the Gracchi, Marius' old colleagues, the publican!, were the 
87 
judges in extortion cases; these trials demonstrated their new poli .. 
tical power. Perhaps Marius envisioned greater political opportuni-
ties from an alliance with this new power bloc rather than trusting 
65 
solely· to the influence of the Metelli. However, Marius did not 
totally disavow the oligarchs as was shown through his opposition as 
t~ibune to a bill proposing the distribution of free grain. Never-
theless, the aspiring politician had lost his status as a client of 
the Metelli and would find the election to future political offices 
difficult. 66 
Marius found that the disappearance of Metell~n support tempo-
rarily stagnated his career. In 118 he was defeated for both the 
curule and plebeian aedileships. With the aid of his new benefactors, 
he won a praetorship in 115, but was charged imm~diately with elect-
oral corruption. Marius escaped conviction through a tie vote of the 
. 67 Jury. As propraetor in Farther Spain, Marius performed his duties 
well and found, when he returned to Rome, that he could resurrect a 
bl . 68 pu 1c career. In 112 he married into the Julii Caesares, a patric-
ian :fami..ly'tinse prestige was ebbing. During the political turmoil of 
the Mamilian Commission Marius was quiet; this apparently reassured 
the Metelli, for he was chosen to accompany Q. Caecilius Metellus to 
. 69 
Africa. 
While in Africa Marius aspired to become consul and asked Metellus 
for a furlough to return to Rome for the elections. Metellus, at 
first, politely refused and indicated to him that he was desiring an 
70 honor reserved for nobles. Marius, however, continued to ask his 
superior for a leave; to one of his requests, Sallust quotes Metellus' 
response, " ••• 'Don't be in a hurry to go to Rome; it will be soon 
enough for you to be a candidate when my son becomes one. 11171 By 
this reply Metellus was instructing Marius to wait at least twenty 
more years before he stood for the consulship; Marius was already 
72 
forty-nine years old. The effect of this affront was to inspire 
him to become a consul by any means. 
To embellish Metellus' insult Sallust conveniently ignores 
88 
Marius' early political career. Sallust says that Marius advanced to 
" • • • office after office, always so conducting himself in each of 
them as to be regarded worthy of a higher position than that which 
he was holding. 1173 Sallust neglects to include information concerning 
Marius' defeat for two aedileships and hi.s narrow escape from con-
74 
viction for electoral corruption after he was elected praetor. For 
Sallust, Marius was the symbol of the talented novus homo excluded by 
75 
nobility's pride. 
After Metellus' insult, Marius embarked upon ~ campaign to under-
mine the noble 1 s command. He began by relaxing the discipline imposed 
upon the men he commanded in winter quarters, and thereby won their 
loyalty. Marius also approached the Roman traders in Africa; to them 
he accused Metellus of purposefully prolonging the war for his own 
glorification. The Roman businessmen in Utica were receptive to these 
alligations, for while the war continued they suffered financial 
losses. To win the traders' support for his consulship, Marius 
76 
promised he could end the war quickly. 
Marius emphasized that Metellus had dealt with him in a haughty 
manner an:l failed to honor him as he deserved. 77 Through lies and 
insubordination, he convinced the equites trading in Africa and in the 
army to write °b:>Ill3to their friends recommending him for the consul-
89 
ship.78 The political turmoil of the recent Mamilian Coimilission also 
aided Marius; the plebs were eager to elect a novus homo consul. 79 
He did not neglect to court the favor of Gauda, a grandson of Masi-
nissa and probable heir after Jugurtha's capture. Gauda, who was 
traveling with Metellus' army, believed the Roman general had insulted 
80 
him; he was therefore willing to promote the interests of Marius. 
Further hatred grew between Marius and Metellus over the revolt 
of a Numidian town, Vega, during the winter of 109-108. Vega was one 
of the Numidian towns in which Metellus had placed a Roman garrison. 
During the winter the townspeople revol.ted and slaughtered every 
Roman soldier except the commander of the garrison, Titus Turpilius 
Silanus. Metellus recaptured the town, and after a court martia 1, 
81 
ordered Turpilius to be scourged and executed. 
Plutarch accused Marius of manipulating the execution of Turpilius 
into politica 1 propaganda. According to Plutarch, Marius pressed 
Metellus to execute Turpilius, who was a Latin client of the Metelli, 
and, after the execution, Turpilius was proven innocent. Metellus' 
remorse for his client's death became hatred toward Marius. 82 Regard-
less of his role in the execution of the Latin, Maiius could have won 
'· 
Latin support for his election to the consulship from the incident. 
In 122 Livius Drusus had proposed a law banning the scourging of Latin 
citizens; if this proposal had become law, Turpilius' sentence would 
have been illegal and therefore a blemish on Metellus 1 reputation. 83 
As Metellus prepared for the campaign of 108, he realized that 
Marius was disruptive to his command, and decided to allow his legate 
84 
to return to Rome for the election. With only twelve days remaining 
85 before the election, Marius raced to Rome. He arrived to find that 
he already had a following in the city. Fortunately for his career, 
Marius rose to. the forefront of Roman politics at the culmination of 
86 
the Mamilian Commission whe.n the nobles were highly unpopular. 
90 
Through defaming his nob le commander and lauding his own common birth, 
Marius won the support of both the equites and plebs, and the consular 
election. 
Marius' cultivation of Roman traders in Africa rewarded him 
with equestrian support. The letters of African traders accusing 
Metellus of prolonging the war were received and believed by the 
87 
Roman equites. Marius' lowly birth was an additional advantage to 
him. His equestrian origins allowed him to assail the incompeten~e, 
pride, and arrogance of the nobles to the delight of the equites and 
88 
plebs. In other times Marius' career as a publicanus would have 
limited him to offices below the consulship; social prejudice and the 
exclusiveness of the nobility normally barred publicani from that 
89 
office. However in the political atmonsphere following the Mamilian 
Commission, a novus homo had a decided advantage. Tribunes praised 
Marius before the assembly and accused Metellus of treason. The plebs 
distrusted the nobility and were eager to award the consulship to a 
90 
new man; farme.rs and craftsmen left their work to attend Marius. 
Marius' victory was essentially a personal one; he had broken 
from the Metelli and formed his own political backing. He was, of 
course, aided by the hatred toward the nobility generated by the 
Mamilian Commission. To increase his appeal, Marius defamed the 
91 
tactics and personality of his former mentor, Q. Caecilius Metellus. 
Marius' purpose in winning the consulship was his own political 
aggrandizement; he had no plan to reform the state and did not desire 
the destruction of the nobility. Instead, he wished to be equal 
to the nobles; through his equestrian and plebeian followers, he 
hoped to counterbalance the hereditary clientelae of the nobles. 
Marius did not want to change the system, but only to share equally 
92 in its rewards. 
91 
For the Senate, Marius' election was a defeat; he had campaigned 
on a promise to end the Jugurthine War quickly. However, before the 
consular elections, the Senate, according to the Sempronian law, 
selected Metellus to command the African legions. 93 In order to 
fulfill his promise, Marius had to have the African command; tr.ibune 
Titus Manlius Mancinus proposed and the comitia passed legislation to 
remove. the direction of the Jugurthine War from Metellus and give 
it to Marius. While Metellus continued the war in Africa, Marius re-
94 
mained in Rome assembling his forces and awaiting his consulship. 
Metellus' campaign of 108 was marked by success on the battl~-
field, but Jugurtha continued to elude him and raise new armies. 
During the previous winter, Metellus had intrigued with Bomilcar to 
deliver Jugurtha to him; unfortunately for Metellus and Bomilcar, 
Jugurtha discovered an assassination plot planned by Bomilcar, and 
killed him. Frustrated in this attempt to end the war, Metellus led 
his army out to meet the Numidians and scored an e~sy victory. Ju-
gurtha escaped to Thala; Metellus pursued him there, but he escaped 
again. In his search for new followers, Jugurtha enlisted Gaetulian 
tribesmen and drilled them as his new army. The king's fortunes were 
aided even more. by the alliance he concluded with his father-in-law, 
King Bacchus of Mauretania. In a combined force Bocchus and Jugurtha 
descended upon Cir ta, 'where Metellus was encamped. Depressed by the 
92 
news that Marius would soon replace him, Metellus avoided any conflict 
and attempted to disrupt the kings' alliance; in this manner, Metellus 
95 
concluded his African campaigns. 
As Metellus stalemated the war, Marius busily prepared for his 
consulship. The new consul asked the Senate for additional troops--a 
request it eagerly approved, for the nobles hoped that Marius would 
lose support when he conscripted his army. To wineril.istments, Marius 
delivered speeches insulting the nobles. Sallust quotes such a speech 
in which Marius degraded the· nobles fo1· their incompetence, lack of 
virtus, avarice, and, in general, worthlessness to that state. These 
speeches had the desired effect; the volunteers for Marius' army 
exceeded the number the Senate had authorized. Marius opened the 
army to the capite censi, or propertyless, who had previously been 
excluded. The new consul arrived with his reinforcements at Utica 
where he received the African legions from Metellus' legate, P. 
Rutilius Rufus. 96 
Metellus refused to meet Marius and quietly departed for Rome. 
He was angry that his command was usurped when he believed he could 
finish the war quickly. In addition, Metellus resented the tactics 
97 
Marius employed to win his consulship. Upon his return to Rome, 
the aristocratic general was charged with extortion, but was ac-
98 quitted. However, when Marius failed to end the war quickly, Metel-
lus gained popularity and was granted a triumph and the title Numidi-
99 
cus. 
To assimilate his new recruits, Marius began his command with 
easy conquests of Numidian towns. Jugurtha continued a guerrilla 
war against Rome's Numidian allies and avoided major confrontations 
93 
with Marius. After many sma 11 but inconsequentia 1 victories, Marius 
decided to change his tactics. He planned to attack and garrison 
Jug~rtha's major fortresses and thereby reduce his power base in 
Numibia. Following this strategy, Marius stormed two of the Numid-
ian's important strongholds: Capsa, and the fortress near the river 
Muluccha. Threatened by the Roman's success, Jugurtha made a des-
perate appeal to Bocchus. Having induced his aid, Jugurtha planned 
a surprise attack on the Romans as they entered winter quarters. 
Marius, with the assistance of his quaestor, Lucius Sulla, routed 
. 100 
the combined forces of Bocchus and Jugurtha twice. 
After his dual defeat as Jugurtha's ally, Bocchus sent messangers 
to Marius requesting that Roman representatives be sent to him for 
a conference. Marius dispatched L. Sulla and Aulus Manlius to the 
Moorish king. Bocchus announced to them that he wished Marius' 
permission to send envoys to Rome. Sulla and Manlius returned to 
the army's winter quarters to await Bocchus' envoys. The king chose 
five of his relatives as envoys to meet with Marius and hopefully to 
continue to Rome to seek peace on any terms. Before they reached the 
Roman winter camp, the Moor's envoys were robbed and, stripped of 
their royal insignia, fled to the Romans. 101 
When the envoys arrived Marius was away from the camp and Sulla 
was in command. Sulla welcomed them and,. in spite of their appear-
ance, accorded them the respect suitable to a king's messangers. 
Upon his return, Marius sutmnoned all members of the senatorial order 
into a council to hear the proposals of Bocchus. A majority agreed 
to the truce the king proposed while his envoys went to Rome. In 
Rome they sought a treaty of friendship with the Roman people, but 
102 
this request was denied until Bocchus earned it. 
Bocchus, remembering Sulla's previous kindness to his envoys, 
requested that Marius send his quaestor to negotiate a conclusion 
to the war. Sulla suggested that the way to win Rome's friendship, 
and part of Numidia, was to arrange the capture of Jugurtha for the 
Romans. At first Bocchus feared that a betrayal of the Numidian 
would cause dissension among his subjects who admired Jugurtha. 
94 
However, Bocchus was overcome by the desire for peace and surrendered 
the Numidian king to Sulla. Marius returned to Rome and led Jugurtha 
and his two sons in chains before his chariot during his triumph in 
103 104; Jugurtha was later strangled in pdson. 
The final territorial settlement of Numidia reflected Rome's 
lack of interest in expanding its province. Bocchus became the 
friend and ally of the Roman people and received the western half of 
Numidia; Gauda, Jugurtha's half-brother, inherited Adherbal's former 
territory in eastern Numidia. Annexation had never been Rome's goal 
in Numidia; Marius did not promise any addition to Rome's African 
province in his campaign for the consulship and did not lose any 
. 104 
support when Numidia remained under African sovereigns. 
The Jurthine War produced three political-military heroes--Metel-
lus, Marius, and Sulla. The nobles could claim that Metellus had 
actually won the war before Marius took the command, and that it was 
Sulla who, in fact, obtained Jugurtha for Rome. Nevertheless, Marius' 
supporters could claim that their leader had driven Jugurtha out of 
105 
Numidia and into the snare of Bocchus. There is a possibility that 
Sallust attempted to magnify Marius' prowess as a general; in his 
95 
narrative, Sallust included the events of 107 and 106--Marius' first 
two years in Africa--in one year. It is difficult to ascribe a mali-
cious motive to this error, however, since Sallust's chronology is 
106 
generally vague. 
Much of Marius' success was due to his strategy of taking and 
garrisoning Jugurtha's strongholds. In this Marius was aided by the 
large number of volunteers to his army which allowed him sufficient 
107 
men to garrison many areas. The Jugurthine War placed Marius onto 
the pedestal of military adoration. Even before he returned to Rome 
with Jugurtha, Marius was elected to defeat Rome's new military 
108 
threat--the Gauls. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 
Sallust, XXVIII. 
2 Ibid., XXIX. 
3 Ibid., XXX-XXXI. 
4 
Ibid., XXXII-XXXIV. 
5 
Ibid., XXXV, 1-9. 
6 Ibid., xxxv, 10. 
7 
Ibid.' XXXVI. 
8 Ibid., XXXVII-XXXVIII. 
9 Ibid., XXXIX. 
lOFrank, Roman Imperialism, p. 268; Syme, Sallust, pp. 174-175. 
llFrank, Roman Imperialism, p. 267; Hill, p. ll8; Marsh, ! History 
.£.! the Roman World from 146 !£ 30 B.c., p. 73. 
12Hill, pp. 118-119; Marsh, ! History of~ Roman World from 146 
!.2 30 B.c., p. 74; Gruen, ~ Politics and the Criminal Courts, p. 
142. 
13Livy, LXIV; Fritz, "Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman Nobi-
lity at the Time of the Wars against Jugurtha (ll2-105 B .c.)," pp. 
148-151; Sallust, XXXI, 25. 
14Fritz, "Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman Nibility at the 
Time of the Wars against Jugurtha (ll2-105 B.c.)," pp. 159-160; Last, 
pp. 119-120; Eutropius, Eutropius's Abridgement of Roman History, tr. 
Rev. John Selby Watson (New York, n.d.), IV, XXVI and Florus, I, 
XXXVI. Both Eutropius and Florus confirm that Jugurtha had enormous 
success bribing Romans. 
15Paul, p. 100; Fritz, "Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman 
Nobility at the Time of the Wars against Jugurtha (ll2-105 B.,C.,)," 
pp. 147-148; Last, pp. ll9-120. 
16 Gruen, Roman Politics !!.!!.!!. the Criminal Courts, p. 140. 
96 
97 
17syme, Sallust, p. 166; Fritz, "Sallust and the Attitude of the 
Roman Nobility at the Time of the Wars against Jugurtha (112-105 
B.c.)," pp. 156-157. 
18Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, p. 141. Perhaps 
Baebius was not bribed by the opp;;ition to Mennnius. I think it may 
have been advantageous to Mennnius to have Jugurtha silenced before 
he could answer any question. This ~ould be true if Jugurtha had 
no incriminating evidence against Bestia and Scaurus, and his forced 
silence could then be used as political propaganda against the nobili-
ty. 
19 
Fritz, "Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman Nobility at the 
Time of the Wars against Jugurtha (112-105 B.,C.,)," pp. 154·-and 160. 
20 b I id., p. 156. 
21Hill, p. 119; Frank, Roman Imperialism, pp. 264-265; Marsh, 
A History of~ Roman World from 146 12, 30 B.C., p. 75. 
22 syme, Sallust, pp. 150-151 and 174-175; Last, pp. 131-132. 
23 Sallust, XL, 1-2. 
24 
Sallust, XL, 3-5; Jones, p. 47. 
25Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, pp. 144-145; 
Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, pp. 49-50; Marcus Tullius Cicero, 
Brutus, tr:-G:' r::-Hendricks~, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London, 1942), 33, 127,- and 34, 128. 
26Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's Numidian Policy," p. 535; Gruen, 
Roman Politics !£..9. the Criminal Courts, pp. 146-147. 
27 Cicero, Brutus, 33, 12T; Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's 
Numid ia n Policy, 11 p. 535 • 
28Gruen, Roman Politics ~ the Criminal Courts, pp. 99-100 and 
145-146; Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's Numidian Policy," p. 535. 
The prosecution and suicide of Carbo was discussed in Chapter II. 
29Gruen, Roman Politics and theCriminal Courts, pp. 144-145; Ci-
cero, Brutus, 34, 128; Earl, "Sallust and. the Senate's Numidian 
Policy," pp. 532- 533. 
30Gruen, Roman Politics .!!!2, the Criminal Courts, pp. 145 and 147. 
31Ibid., pp. 99 and 145. 
32 Sallust, XLI, 2-5. 
33Ibid., XLI, 7. 
34Ibid., XLI, 8-9 and XLII. 
35 
Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 196, footnote 2; Gruen, Ro1111ni. 
Politics~~ Criminal Courts, pp. 144-145; A. N; Sherwin-White, 
''Violence in Roman Politics," Journal of Roman Studies, XLVI {1956), 
p. 3. 
98 
36Hill, pp. ll9-120; Jones, p. 53; Gruen, Roman Politics and the 
Criminal Courts, pp. 144-145; in Brutus, 34, 128. Cicero specifically 
states that the jurors for the Mamilian Commission were Gracchan ; 
judges, and in Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Plancio, tr. N. H. Watt~, 
The Loeb Classica 1 Library (Cambridge ,"""Ma'ss. and London, 1935), XXIX, 
70, he gives his assessment of their verdict by describing them as 
" ••• unnatural children of their fatherland." 
37 
Last, p. 121; Gruen, Roman Politics ~ the Criminal Courts, pp. 
148-149. 
38syme, Sallust, p. 172; this premise is strengthened by the. fact 
that Cassius became the colleague of Marius in the consulship of 107, 
as noted by Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's Numidian Policy," p. 534. 
39Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's Numidian Policy," pp. 534-545; 
Earl conjectures that the thirty-two men ousted from the Senate in 
115 may have supported the faction behind the Mamilian quaestio. 
40 Earl, "Sallust and the Senate 1 s Numidian Policy," pp. 533-534. 
and 536; Sherwin-White, p. 3. 
4 1Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, pp. 143-145. 
42. 
Gruen, Roman Politics fil!2. the Criminal Courts, p. 149; Frank, 
Roman Imperialism, p. 263. 
43sherwin-White, p. 3. 
44Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, pp. 149-150, for 
example, after the commission,,M. Aemilius Scaurus was forced by a 
tribune to resign his censorship. 
45Ibid., p. 150. 
46A. Hands and E. Gruen will be cited as defenders of Scaurus. 
47syme, Sallust, p. 165; A. R. Hands, "Sallust and Dissimalatio," 
Journal of Roman Studies, XLIX (1959), p. 58. 
48Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's Numidian Policy," p. 536. 
49Gruen, Roman Politics and~ Criminal Courts, pp. 148-149. 
50 Hands, p. 58; Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, pp. 
148-149. 
51Hands, pp. 57 and 59-60. 
52 Gruen, Roman Politics~ the Criminal Courts, pp. 147-149. 
53 
Sallust, XLIII, 1 and 5. 
54 Sf;lllust, XLIII, 5; Hill, pp •. 120-121; Last, p. 122. 
99 
55Marsh, ! History of ~ Roman World from 146 !.Q. 30 Jl.&, p., 76; 
Plutarchus, 11Sulla, 11 Plutarch's Lives, Vol. IV, tr. Bernadotte Perrin, 
The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1950), VII, 
l; Broughton, Magistrates of the~ Republic, PP• 545-547. 
56 Sallust, XLIV, XLVI, 1-4, and XLVII, 3; Mollllilsen, History of 
Rome, p. 399; Holroyd, pp. 3-4. 
57sallust, XLVIII-LIV, 1-4; Last, pp. 122-123. 
58sallust, LIV, 5-10 and LV, 8; Last, pp. 122-123. 
59 Sallust, LXI, 4-5 and LXII; Last, pp. 123-124. 
60 Gruen, Roman Politics and fil Criminal _Courts, p. ll8. 
61 . Ernst Bad1an, VMarius and the Nobles," Durham Universit;_y_ .J:2.!!!:.-
nal, LVI (1964), pp. 142 and 144-145; Gruen, Roman Politics and the 
Crimina 1 Courts, p. lll. 
62Badian, "Marius and the Nobles," p. 145; Plutarchus, "Caius Mat"-
ius,11 Plutarch's Lives, Vol. IX, tr. Bernadotte Perrin, The Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1950), IV, 1. 
63Plutarch, ''Marius, 11 IV, 2; Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 
p. 47; Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, pp. 39 and 76; Botsford, p. 
389, notes that Marius' electoral reform was not permanent, for the 
oligarchs found other means to influence voters. 
64Gruen, Roman Politics and the Crimina 1 Courts, p. 119; Plutarch, 
"Marius," IV, 2-3. 
65Badian, "From the Gracchi to Sulla (1940-1959)," p. 215; Badian, 
''Marius and the Nob le s, " p. 145. 
66Badian, "Marius and the Nobles," p. 145; Plutarch,''Marius, 11 IV, 
4; Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, p. ll9, offers 
another explanation for Mariusr-opposition to the grain bill. He 
proposes that Marius was acting in the interests of the equites, not 
the oligarchs • 
67 Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, pp. 123-124; 
Jones, pp. 52-53; Badian, ~Mariu;-;nd the Nobles," p. 145; Plutarch, 
''Marius," V, 2. 
68 Plutarch, ''Marius," VI, 1-2. 
69 Badian, "Marius and the Nobles," p. 146. 
70 Sallust, LXI!I-LXIV, 11'2. 
71 Sallust, LXIV, 3-4; Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, p. 73, 
states that Metellus' remark may have been a pledge of continued 
support for his client, Marius, rather than an insult. 
72 Sallust, LXIV, 4. 
73Ibid., LXIII, 5. 
100 
74Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, p. 72; Syme, Sallust, pp. 
160-161, believes that Sallust's intent was not to mislead the reader 
concerning Marius' career, but the omission resulted from lack of 
research. 
75Earl, Moral and Political Tradition of Rome, p. 50~ 
76 
Sallust, LXIV, 5-6. 
77 Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History of Diodorus of Sicily, 
Vol. XII, tr:. Francis R. Walton, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London, 1967), XXXr:f/XXXV, 38, l; Hill, pp. 120-121. 
78Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, p. 74; Sallust, LXV, 4-5; 
Plutarch, ''Marius, 11 VII, 4; Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman 
History, tr. Frederick W. Shipley, The Loeb Classical Library (Cam-
bridge, Mass. and London, 1967), II, XI, 2; Marcus Tullius Cicero, 
De Officiis, tr. Walter Miller, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London, 1947), III, 79. 
79 Sallust, LXV, 5; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 196; Earl, 
Political Thought of Sallust, p. 7. 
80 Sallust, LXV, 1-3. 
81 Ibid., LXVI-LXIX. 
82Plutarch, ''Marius," VIII, 2; Gruen, Roman Politics and the Crim-
inal Courts, p. 153, notes that Plutarch's description is considered 
anti-Marian propaganda. 
83 Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, p. 154; Badian, 
Foreign Clierttelae, pp •. 196-197.~ 
84 Sallust, LXXIII, 1-2. 
85Plutarch, ''Marius," VIII, 4. 
101 
86 Gelzer, p. 133. 
87sallust, LXXIII, 3; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 202; Velleius, 
II, XI, 2; Alan John Nisbet Wilson, Emigration from _J;,_ta ly _in the 
Republican Age .Q.f Rome (New York, 1966), pp. 44-45. 
88sherwin-White, p. 3. 
89Gelzer, pp. 15-16; Badian, Publicans and Sinners, p. 51; Badian, 
''Marius and the Nobles," p. 146, notes thathom 150-111 only fourteen 
men from non-consular families were elected consul. 
90sallust, LXXIII, 5-6; Earl, Political Thought of Sallust, p. 74; 
Cassius Dio Cocceianus, Dio's Roman History, Vol. II, tr. Earnest Cary, 
The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1961), XXVI, 
89, 3. 
91 Carney, pp. 27-28; Earl, Political Thought .2.f Sallust, p. 76; 
Richard Edwin Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army (Manchester, 
1958), pp. 9-10; Earl, Moral and Political Tradition of~' pp. 
48-49. 
92 Earl, Moral ~ Political Tradition .2.f ~' p. 51; Plutarch, 
''Marius," IX, 4; Badian, Roman Imperialism in~ Late Republic, p. 51. 
93 Marcus Tullius Cicero, ~ QQ!!!2 ~' tr. N. H. Watts, The Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1935), IX, 24; 
Botsford, p. 381; Marsh, Founding of the Roman Empire, p. 41. 
94 Sallust, LXXIII, 7. 
95 Sallust, LXX-LXXII, LXXIV-LXXVI, and LXXX-LXXXIII; Last, pp. 
123-125. . 
. 
96sa llust, LXXXIV-LXXXVI; Plutarch, "Marius," IX, 1-4. 
97sallust, LXXXII, 3 and LXXXVI, 5; Plutarch, "Marius," X, 1. 
98 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Balbo, tr. R. Gardner, The Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1958), V, 11. 
99 Badian, ''Marius and the Nobles," p. 146; Velleius, II, XI, 2. 
100 Sallust, LXXXVII-CI. 
lOlibid., CII-CIII, 1-4. 
102sallust, CIII-CIV; Plutarch, "Sulla," III, l; Diodorus, XXX"DL/ 
xxxv, 39, 1. 
103 Sallust, CV-CXIV; Eutropius, IV, XXVII; Velleius, II, XII, l; 
Livy, LXVII. 
102 
104 
Last, p. 130; Badian, Roman Imperialism.!!! the Late Republic, 
p. 27. 
105Last, p. 129; Plutarch, ''Marius," X, 5-6 and "Sulla," III, 3-IV, 
1 and VI, 1-2. Plutarch dates the origin of Marius' dislike for 
Sulla to Sulla's glorification of his own role in the capture of 
Jugurtha. 
106 . 
Fritz, "Sallust and the Attitude of the .Roman Nobility at the 
Time of the Wars against JtJgurtha (112-105 BoC.), 11 pp. 158-159; 
Henry Francis Pelham, "Chronology of the Jugurthine War," in Essays 
.2x, Henry Francis Pelham, ed. F. Haverfield (Oxford, 19ll), pp. 16-17; 
H. v. Canter, "The Chronology of Sallust's Jugurtha," Classical 
Journal, VI (1911), p. 295; Syme, Sallust, pp. 142-143 and 149-150, 
believes that Sallust may have reserved details, such as chronology, 
for the conunentarii. 
107 
Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, p. 155; Holroyd, 
pp. 14-17. 
108 
Sallust, CXIV., 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Jugurthine War was of only minor military signifi• 
cance, the events which it triggered in Rome broug~t the Republic 
closer to monarchism. During the Ntjmidian war, the equites and plebs 
once again formed an alliance and effectively attacked the nobility. 
Marius' military reorganization also occurred dufing this period--an 
action which would eventually result in the destruction of the Repub-
1 
lie. These changes in Rome's political system were at first subtle; 
but when the weakening of the Senate was coupled with the rise of 
those politician-generals who subordinated the constitution to their 
personal glory, the Republic was destroyed. 
Superficially the program of the Gracchi did not drastically 
affect the nobility, for, after their demise, the nobles continued 
their factional squabbles and ignored Rome's domestic crises. However, 
the Gracchi had established a political precedent by joining their 
newly created equestrian order with the plebs. It was this alliance 
which would.shatter the apparent domestic tranquility the oligarchs 
enjoyed after the Gracchi. Fortunately for the Senate the coalition 
of the equites and plebs were only temporary, as in the case of the 
Mamilian Conunission. After such a complete victory over the nobles, 
the coalition's power subsided as the crisis cooled, and the Senate 
appointed an eminent aristocratic general to finish the war. When 
Metellus did not end the war quickly, the old animosity toward the 
103 
nobility surfaced, and the equites and plebs chose Marius, a novus 
homo, to eliminate the Numidian nuisance. 2 
When Marius had departed for Africa, the oligarchs, hoping the 
equites were distracted, attempted to recover their judicial power. 
104 
Q. Servilius Caepio, a member of the Metellan factio, was elected 
consul for 106; at that time Marius had been in Africa for a year and 
had not concluded the war. As the war continued, the nobles became 
more popular and 106 became the target date for forcing the equites 
to accept senators as jurors on the courts. The nobles did not fear 
the equites' judgments on extortion cases, instead it was the recent 
Mamilian guaestio which horrified them. The oligarchs wished to have 
a mixed jury, an equal number of equites and senators, so they could 
eliminate the equesttian use of the special courts. Representing the 
interests of all nobles, Caepio proposed and secured passage of the 
~ Servilia, which created mixed juries and reversed the ~ Acilia 
of 123, G. Gracchus' measure. The lex Servilia, however, never went 
into effect and was soon repealed; Caepio's law gave the Metellan 
factio more prestige than other aspiring_ graips could tolerate. When 
the nobles were unchallenged by the equites and plebs, their factional 
disputes consumed their energies, and as a result, popular leaders 
3 
would arise again in 104. 
After his "consulship in 106, Caepio was given a proconsular assign-
ment in Gaul for 105; Cn. Mallius Maximus, consul for 105, was also 
assigned Gaul. Unfortunately for the soldiers serving under Caepio 
and Mallius, Mallius, a novus .!!2!!!2, had defeated Q. Lutatius Catulus, 
Caepio's brother-in-law, in the consular election. Caepio refused to 
join his forces with Mallius--a decision which resulted in the defeat 
105 
at Arausio in which 80,000 soldiers died. Popular agitation was at a 
4 
peak; the comitia tributa abrogated Caepio's command in 105. In 104 
tribune L. Cassius Longinus' plebiscite eliminated from the Senate 
anyone who had been judicially condemned or whose imperium had been 
abrogated by the people; Caepio 1 s punishment, however, was to go 
beyond his exclusion from the Senate. In 104 he was tried and con-
5 demned for embezzlement. 
The year 104 witnessed the emergence of new political alliances 
to attack the Metellan faction. The legislation of L. Cassius Long-
inus was calculated to embarrass the Metelli's ~lient, Caepio. Other 
nobles, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and L. Marcius Philippus, who opposed 
the Metelli initiated popular legislation designed to undermine that 
faction's influence. The year 104 was also significant for Marius' 
supporters; in that year Marius was consul, C. Memmius was praetor, 
6 
and L. Saturninus was quaestor. It was also during this period of 
political realignments that the courts were returned to the equites 
by the tribune Servilius Glaucia. 7 
Eventually the equites began to use the extortion courts for 
their political advantage. Before the nineties the courts were not 
excessive or cruel in prosecuting the nobles, and, in fact, had been 
generous with their acquittals. However, the trial of P. Rutilius 
Rufus in 92 reversed ~his trend. Rutilius had been the legate of Q. 
Scaevola during his reorganization of Asia; many equites resented 
Scaevola 1 s changes and c~ose to prosecute Rutilius as their revenge. 
The conviction of this former consul alarmed the nobles; they feared 
that the equites could subvert the power of the Senate. It was to 
bring the equites under their control that the nobles proposed 
another system of choosing jurors. Tribune M. Livius Drusus, sup-
ported by L. Crassus and M. Scaurus, proposed that the Italians be 
enfranchised and the Senate enlarged by three hundred equites, then 
8 
the album of jurors would be selected from this new Senate. His 
106 
proposal met with unyielding resistance; Drusus was assassinated and 
the equites retained their judiciary position--a power which Badian 
9 labled as irresponsible. 
During the Jugurthine War, the equites, although there were 
periods that they dominated politics, did not assume the Senate's con-
trol of Roman affai-rs. Even after the Mamilian Commission, it was 
the Senate's choice, Metellus, who was sent to Africa. After his 
failure to secure a speedy victory, the equites insisted that Marius 
conduct the war. When the Senate regained its power, it awarded a 
triumph to Metellus although he had not finished the war. The final 
settlement of Numidia at the conclusion of the war was essentially 
the same territorial division the Senate made for Jugurtha and 
10 
Adherbal--half of Numidia .went to Bocchus and half to Gauda. The 
Senate met the periodic challenges of the equites and remained the 
ll 
dominant body in Roman politics. 
The submission of the equites to the Senate's leadership was 
diminished by the nobles' attempts to take over the courts. Feuding 
over the composition of the jury continued throughC:>Ut the rest of 
the Republican period. As the equites resisted the nobles, new soc-
12 
ia 1 and politica 1 barriers .wer.e erected between the groups. The 
objective of defeating the opposition obsessed Roman politicians, 
nobles and equites, as the squabbles over the extortion courts forced 
the Republic to the brink of dissolution. 13 
107 
Marius' military reorganization was of vastly greater consequence 
than the feuds of the nobles and equites. Marius' reforms created 
the vehicle which would demolish what remained of Rome's Republic. 
The professional army which he created could not be controlled by 
the Senate; consequently, the armies, manipulated by their generals, 
reduced Rome to such chaos that the Republic was abandoned and order 
14 
was restored by the Principate. 
The major reform Marius made in Rome's military structure was to 
allow men who did not meet the property qualification to volunteer 
for his army. Before Marius, only men who possessed a certain amount 
15 
of wealth could serve in Rome's army. This army was a citizen army; 
the soldiers provided their own equipment and received no pension when 
they were demobilized. As Rome's territorial hegemony expanded, more 
and more men were required to meet its military needs. As a result, 
the property qualifications began to be lowered; G. Gracchus' legis-
lation allowed for state funding of equipment so that those who 
16 
could not provide their own could be enrolled in the army. Since 
Gracchus' agrarian reform did not produce a sufficiept number of 
17 
small farmers to be drafted, the military faced a manpower shortage. 
To b~gin his first campaign in Numidia, Marius chose to draft 
from the Latins, Italians, and clients of Rome; he also opened the 
ranks to the proletarii and the capite censi--two groups which had 
previously only been included in times of emergency. This was not a 
revolutionary reform, but a culmination of a series of lowered re-
18 quirements for the legions. Previously the Roman army had contained 
only property owners, but, as Rome's wars spread over the Mediter-
ranean, the men of wealth resented the periods of extended service. 19 
108 
Therefore; there was no senatorial opposition to Marius' recruitment. 
The nobles believed that Marius would lose his plebeian support after 
they were enrolled in the army. Instead the plebs welcomed the 
opportunity for booty and possible advancement in the army. 20 While 
Marius' changes appeared innocent, they were to alter the composition 
21 
of Rome's army and its political system. 
Men of the equestrian order welcomed a voluntary system. As 
men of little or no property joined the army, they lifted much of 
22 
the military burden from the equites. The proletarii and the 
capite censi did no.t complain when their tours of duty were extended; 
these unemployed men, usually from rural areas, viewed the army as 
23 their profession and as a means to obtain land and booty. Before 
150 the Senate had occasionally provided land allotments to the 
discharged veterans, but after 150 this practice was apparently 
abandoned. Marius revived this system when his tribune L. Saturninus 
secured a bill distributing a hundred iugera to each of Marius' 
veterans in Africa. The Bagradas valley in Africa was annexed to 
'24 Rome's province to provide land for these allotments. The Roman 
army became an army of the rural unemployed, eager for booty and land, 
and dependent upon their generals to secure this for them. 25 
· When the army relied upon its general for its livelihood, the 
soldiers and the general established a client-patron relationship. 
While this may have not been Marius' primary goal, his army became 
his personal clientelae--a force to offset the inherited clientelae of 
26 
the nobles. Although some ancient sources portray Marius as sedi-
tious and eager to overthrow the privileged class, he was, on the con-
trary, attempting to build his own political following, equal to the 
109 
nobles. 27 As a novus homo, Marius built his factio from his army; he 
wished to become a princeps civitatis, or a great statesman. In fact, 
after Marius had established his career, nobles joined his faction. 28 
The establishment of a client-patron relationship between sold-
iers and their general was a monumental disaster fol:: the Republic. 
The soldiers received their livelihood and hopes of a land allotment 
from their general--not from the state. Before Marius, soldiers took 
an oath of allegiance to their general, but generals changed quickly 
and wars were short. After Marius' reforms, the army was professional 
and their loyalty was given to their general--not to the state. After 
wars were concluded, armies were willing to follow their patron, the 
29 general, even in unconstitutional acts. The army had become the 
weapon which would crumble the Republic. 30 
Simultaneously with the advent of the professidnal army was the 
creation of the politician-general to exploit such an army. After 
the volunteer system began, generals had to have good military repu-
31 
tations to entice the booty-hungry plebs to join. Since Rome's 
armies were now professional, some system for the retirement of the 
armies had to be implemented. Land bonuses became the pension for 
I 
the soldie.rs and it was the genera 11 s responsibility to secure this 
32 
for them. To provide land allotments, the general had to sponsor 
a lex agraria for his soldiers, and to insure its passage, the gen-
eral had to be a powerful politician also. For political support, the 
politician-general relied upon his present army and former veterans 
33 
settled throughout the Mediterranean, for they were his clients. 
The politician-generals exploited the discontented groups in 
Rome. Marius used the anger of the equites and pl.ebs to win the 
110 
consulship, and then manipulated the comitia to override the Senate's 
34 
choice of Metellus for the Numidian command. The interference of 
the comitia in Rome's foreign affairs was a serious curtailment of 
the Senate's power, but, more significantly, it was to provide future 
generals with a means to remain in power even against that assembly's 
wishes. The later politician-generals--Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar--
35 
manipulated the equites and plebs to remain in power. Disregarding 
their claims of support for either the constitution--meaning the dom-
inance of the nobles--or the people, the real essence of the civil 
discord produced by the politician-generals was whether the state 
would be ruled by the tyranny of the oligarchy or the dictatorship 
36 
of the individual. 
The personal, professional army quickly e·scaped senatorial con-
trol. When a general established a successful reputation, the people 
demanded that the Seante choose him to combat Rome's enemies. An 
example of the Senate's limitation was when Marius returned from. 
Africa and was given the command in Gaul; the people considered him 
the only possible saviour for Rome. Later when the politician-gener-
als grew even more powerful, the Senate had few alternatives in com-
bating a general who flaunted the constitution. If the Senate chose 
another general to protect its interests, and that general was vie-
torious, the oligarchy found that they had merely traded the tyranny 
37 
of one general for that of another. Eventually the Republic col-
lapsed beneath the strain of civil discord and domestic chaos; it was 
the Principate which solved the military problem and returned the 
38 
allegiance of the armies to the state. 
Under the Principate, Augustus instituted state donatives and 
111 
land allotments to soldiers upon their discharge; this broke the 
client-patron ties between the army and the general, and returned the 
39 
army's primary allegiance to the state. K. von Fritz termed the 
land question a piece of historical ii:ony; the nobles thwarted the 
land program of the Gracchi, only to have their government overthrown 
by armies of unemployed peasants following subversive generals who 
promised them land. 40 The nobles ignored the easy solution and for-
41 
feited their government to military dictatorships. 
The political innovations and evolutions during the Jugurthine 
War shoved Rome toward the establishment of a monarchy. The two 
most important political innovations of the period were the institu-
tion of the personal, professional army and the emergence of the poli-
tician-generals--the two factors which were the immediate cause of the 
Republic's demise. The political squabbles of t~e equites and the 
nobles evolved from the Gracchan period and were intensified by the 
Mamilian Commission. An understanding of the political maneuvers at 
Rome during the Jugurthine War aids in illuminating the transitional 
period between the Gracchi and the _Principate. 
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